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FOLLOWING FORM: CORPORATE SUCCESSION
AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
Adam F. Scales*
The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned had
thirty oars, and was preserved by the Athenians . . . for they took
away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger
timber in their place, insomuch that this ship became a standing ex-
ample among the philosophers, for the logical question of things
that grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and
the other contending that it was not ....
Plutarch, Theseus'
INTRODUCTION
Legal systems do not always play well with one another. A body of
law developed over centuries carves channels of thought into the
worldview of its enthusiasts. When its tenets conflict with those of
another, the body of law tends to comprehend the problem entirely
within its own well-defined norms. Why should the norms of another
system obtrude?
The other system may be no more charitable. If it is a newer one,
the urge is to abandon the dead-hand grip of a past unresponsive to
modern conditions. An older system may perceive no remit to unset-
tle the wisdom of the ages.
Convinced of their respective and essential rectitude, different sys-
tems may offer entirely different answers to the same question. Each
answer appears correct, given the norms of the system being asked to
respond. When they intersect, however, the law ought to be capable
of articulating rules that do not turn on which system the judge had in
mind that day. Rather than a game of jurisprudential musical chairs
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. I am grateful to Joe Ulrich,
Tom Baker, Sean Griffith, Jeff Stempel, and Andrew Gold for their thoughtful comments on
drafts of this piece. David Millon labored tirelessly (though perhaps unsuccessfully) to help me
understand the mysteries of corporate law. I benefited greatly from workshops hosted by the UC
Hastings faculty and the Rutgers School of Law in Camden, New Jersey. It was an honor to
present this work at the Clifford Symposium.
1. 1 PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH'S LivEs OF iLUSTRIOUS MEN 21 (John Dryden trans., 1879),
available at http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/theseus.htm.
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that inevitably leaves one or more systems out, legal rules should pro-
vide a place at the table for all.
Corporate succession offers the interplay of three substantial sys-
tems of law: (1) corporate law, which seeks to direct capital efficiently
by channeling risks as private actors see fit; (2) tort law, which allo-
cates injury costs retroactively; and (3) an insurance law system, which
distributes the costs of accidents across time and space. This descrip-
tion has been written to underscore some essential similarities across
these bodies of law. However, problems arise precisely because each
system manages uncertainty differently, with varying degrees of re-
gard for its neighbors. Sometimes, high fences make good neighbors,
but not here.
II. THE PROBLEM
Corporations regularly engage in tortious conduct, ranging from
mere inadvertence to unconscionable venality. The tort system allo-
cates responsibility accordingly, imposing liability for damages. Often
that liability is satisfied by a matching obligation of the corporation's
liability insurer, which typically must defend the corporate policy-
holder as well. Most of the time, this is an abstractly interesting but
unremarkable exercise. But every now and then, the participants col-
lide because of features unique to each.
Corporations last indefinitely, but they rarely retain the same struc-
ture indefinitely. Mutability is one of the signature characteristics of
capital organization, and a company may be reorganized for a host of
reasons, including operational efficiency, tax considerations, or risk
management.
Liability insurance policies often possess their own pseudo-indefi-
nite character. Although policies have definite time limits on cover-
age, that coverage may be triggered by events that are only perceived
decades later.2 This "occurrence-based" characteristic is extremely
valuable to policyholders, though it can be a source of chagrin for in-
surers. The chagrin stems from the eccentricities of liability law which
is of course the raison d'etre for liability insurance.
Tort law has changed dramatically since the middle of the twentieth
century.3 Liability has been expanded (in kind and degree) in ways
that were unforeseeable when many insurance policies were written.
2. 1 INTERNATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, COMMERCIAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
§ II.C.1 (Supp. No. 116 2010).
3. George Priest, The Monsanto Lectures: Modern Tort Law & Its Reforms, 22 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1987).
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Together with liability insurance law's focus on when an injury oc-
curred (as distinct from when the injury became legally cognizable), it
is not unusual for insurers (and their policyholders) to awaken to lia-
bilities that would have been merely the stuff of bad dreams decades
earlier. Two types of tort claims share this characteristic to a high
degree: product liability and environmental harms. Car accidents and
slip-and-fall cases rarely present this difficulty.
This difficulty can be managed, but it is complicated by the above-
described tendency of corporations to change form. Environmental
and product harms recognized decades after commission will likely
reveal substantial alterations in the nature of the firm that created
them. Indeed, the firm may no longer exist-at least not in a form to
which both liability and insurance coverage are easily imputed.
This dynamic is illustrated by Henkel Corporation v. Hartford Acci-
dent and Indemnity,4 a 2003 decision of the California Supreme Court.
Henkel was a watershed; it revealed the complex tensions between
different bodies of law that had been obscured by patchwork treat-
ment and occasional judicial pronouncement. From one perspec-
tive-the obviously enlightened view of the insurance professoriate-
Henkel appears to be completely wrong. Reflection suggests, how-
ever, that it is merely mostly wrong. Understanding why requires
tracing its doctrinal and conceptual antecedents to discover and vali-
date the competing values that collide in such cases. Then, we may
chart an appropriate course for Theseus' ship.
III. HENKEL
In the late 1970s, Union Carbide purchased all the stock of
Amchem and merged with it.5 Amchem became a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Union Carbide. Union Carbide formed a second subsidiary,
transferring to the subsidiary all of the assets and liabilities relating to
Amchem's metal-treating business. By convention, we may now refer
to Amchem No. 1 (which retained an agricultural chemicals business)
and Amchem No. 2. Amchem No. 1-the asbestos-encrusted husk of
the original firm6-was purchased by Rhone-Poulenc. No. 2 was pur-
chased by and merged into the Henkel Corporation.
Corporate acquisitions are frequently followed by heartburn, and
this came in the form of lawsuits by a group of Lockheed employees
who alleged exposure to Amchem-produced toxic chemicals during
4. Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2003).
5. Id. at 71-72.
6. Jeffrey M. Applegate et al., Thinking About Asbestos, LliMANBROTIIERS.COM (Mar. 20,
2002), http://www.nationalcenter.org/AsbestosLehman.pdf.
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the course of their employment. The employees sued Rhone, as one
of the apparent successors to Amchem, and Henkel, which was the
most obvious candidate as the successor to Amchem No. 2. Henkel
turned to Hartford, which had in simpler times insured the original
Amchem. Henkel claimed that as successor to Amchem's liabilities
(there was no suggestion of misconduct by Henkel itself, or in its
Amchem incarnation after acquisition) it was entitled to a defense and
indemnity from Hartford. Hartford thought differently, and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court agreed.7
Cases such as Henkel require consideration of the structure of cor-
poration law, particularly as it relates to shareholder immunity and
mergers and acquisitions. This leads to a small but essential corner of
torts relating to "successor liability." Together, they provide the back-
drop for the insurance contract to operate and for different theories of
insurance interpretation. Simply put, is insurance law for contracting
parties who should be free to do as they wish? Or is liability insurance
law substantially geared towards the interests of tort claimants, who
are realistically the likeliest beneficiaries of coverage? Leah Wortham
once suggested that insurance was "[t]oo [i]mportant to be [left to the
[a]ctuaries;" 8 here we may ask if it is too important to be left to merg-
ers and acquisitions lawyers.
IV. CORPORATE IDENTITY AND LIABILITY
A discussion of corporate law inevitably begins with the question,
"What is a corporation?"9 Obviously, it is a means for aggregating
capital and directing production. But "means" are not the same as
"meaning." Different answers have emerged over the centuries.' 0
Dominant for now is the view that a corporation is a nexus of con-
tracts among labor, capital, and management."1 A corporation is less
a thing than a place-a street corner where mutually interested parties
arrange to meet and conduct their business. When that business is
concluded and the parties go their separate ways, we know we are
7. See Henkel, 62 P.3d at 76.
8. Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to the Actuaries, 19 U.
Micri. J.L. REFORM 349 (1986).
9. See, e.g., BRUCE WELLING ET AL., CANADIAN CORPORATE LAW: CASES, Nons & MATERI-
ALS 125 (3d ed. 2006).
10. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDozo L. REv. 261 (1992).
11. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts,
and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 819 (1999) (citing Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)).
[Vol. 60:573576
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guilty of misplaced concretion when we point to the empty street cor-
ner and say that it is the corporation.
Essential to this perspective is the perhaps counterintuitive realiza-
tion that the elements of the corporation are not, in and of them-
selves, the corporation. This is evident enough if one is thinking about
a low-level employee. 12 And one probably would not regard the sup-
pliers of materials to the corporation to be the corporation. But con-
sider management and shareholders. These appear to the untrained
eye to be decent proxies for the corporation itself. But that is the
untrained perspective. Ownership is not identity, and-in large cor-
porations, at least-it does not presuppose operational control.
Although not essential to the concept of the corporation, sharehold-
ers have enjoyed a limited liability that emerged gradually during the
nineteenth century.' 3 Liability is limited in that shareholders risk only
the amount of their investments in enterprises that fail, default on
debt, or incur tort liability. The obvious rationale for this is the en-
couragement of risk-taking and enterprise, which corporate law
presumes will be suboptimal given a rule requiring shareholders to
internalize the losses as well as the gains from joint activity.14 A less
obvious and perhaps more compelling justification focuses on the
mechanics of capital formation. Without shareholder immunity, the
value of shares rises or falls depending on the wealth of their owners.
In a deep, active market for shares, such information would be nearly
impossible to obtain and integrate into share prices that fluctuate after
every transfer. This would itself eliminate the possibility of a deep
market for shareholding and inhibit firms from aggregating the capital
necessary for their operations.' 5  This rationale does not apply to
closely held firms and may not describe the functioning of modern
holding companies.16 Its continued grip may simply be one of the bet-
12. This intuition must be qualified by the observation that the acts of even low-level employ-
ees can usually be attributed to the organization through vicarious liability. See, e.g., JoIN C.P.
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN ZIPURSKY, TORrs 58 (2010). This is a perfectly sensible rule, but it is
more a convenient convention for pretermitting disputes over agency and ensuring compensa-
tion for tort victims rather than a conclusion of legal identity between the employee and the
firm.
13. See Phillip 1. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 576
(1986).
14. See Susan E. Woodward, Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL
& T!iFORETnCAI ECON. 601, 602 (1985).
15. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing (unpublished manuscript 2000),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=236967.
16. See Blumberg, supra note 13, at 629-30.
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ter illustrations of "preservation-through-transformation," 17 but it is
powerful and penetrates deeply into the structure of corporate law.
It is a rationale that syncs up neatly with the rules governing liabil-
ity for corporate successors or, to be more accurate, the limited excep-
tions to the default rule of non-liability. "Corporate succession" is a
term made imprecise by the variety of elements within a predecessor
to which a putative successor might lay claim. The default position of
corporate law is that a succession amounting to less than a formal
merger (which is generally governed by statute) does not ordinarily
impose upon the successor the debts, including tort obligations, of the
predecessor. The stock of the predecessor may be acquired; physical
and incorporeal assets may be transferred; debt may be issued that
yields the incidents of ownership. What is required for potential lia-
bilities to transfer as well is the kind of additional "x-factor" to which
corporate law is often allergic: (1) the successor agrees to assume the
predecessor's debts and liabilities; (2) the transfer is a de facto merger
in which the parties have merely arranged a form that evades the stat-
utory requirements yet have in substance united their operations; (3)
the successor is a "mere continuation" of the predecessor (again, this
rests on the conclusion that form and substance have parted ways);
and (4) the succession was designed for the purpose of defrauding
creditors.18 There is much to say about these rules, but notice that
they serve corporate law's interest in limiting shareholder liability to
the amount invested. That is, absent special circumstances, a financial
obligation of the predecessor-a claim that might very well be "under-
water" because of the predecessor's inability to pay it-does not auto-
matically become more valuable because of the fortuity of acquisition
by a richer, more solvent firm.' 9 Corporations in distress yet possess-
ing valuable assets can, with planning, rinse from those assets the lia-
bilities they have generated and transfer them to productive use in
another's hands. This is, of course, an uncharitable description. Con-
sider another: the separation of the corporation into its constituent
parts permits efficient use of assets, despite their temporary location
within a larger, tort-generating organization. Restricting liability to
cases in which the corporate form has only nominally changed (that is,
17. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALI
L.J. 2117, 2178 (1996).
18. See Howard L. Schechter, Acquiring Corporate Assets Without Successor Liability: Is It a
Myth?, 1986 CoiJm. Bus. L. Re-v. 137, 138-40.
19. A direct merger or consolidation would have this effect, which is precisely why such trans-
actions are typically conducted though subsidiaries.
[Vol. 60:573578
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the "successor" has a relationship of identity with the "predecessor"),
or has been "abused," is consistent with this efficiency norm.
V. INSURANCE AND IDENTITY
Before returning to Henkel, we must sketch the relationship be-
tween a liability insurer and its corporate policyholder. All insurance
contracts transfer risk among contracting parties, each of which may
be regarded as a proxy for others in the risk-distributive chain. To
work well, insurance requires, in Ken Abraham's timeless phrase, a
"special sort of uncertainty." 20 We must know that misfortune will
strike with some regularity, but we cannot know precisely when. Ide-
ally, one would like to know "how much?" That is, given the known
and unknown risks of loss, what are the boundaries that define liabil-
ity? The policyholder is in most cases transferring a sum certain to
achieve this limitation. The insurer in theory can specify the upper
limit with precision, and the vast majority of contracts purport to do
so. But insurance policies written decades ago did not specifically
contemplate tort system-level developments that augured poorly for
judicial recognition of the boundaries insurers had thought settled
long ago.
A central specification is that coverage extends only to the policy-
holder actually described in the policy. Although insurers and com-
mentators sometimes suggest a little more discrimination than actual
underwriting practices reflect, the fact is that the insurer has agreed to
bear a set of risks tied to a particular policyholder. Should that policy-
holder change, the risks would seem to change as well. If the policy
benefits were nonetheless transferred, this would create a situation
where, at best, an interloper is permitted to reap without toil. Worse,
an insurer might be responsible for risks it did not and could not have
foreseen. While neither of these developments in isolation might
destabilize the insurance system, they would put substantial pressure
on the pervasive notion that insurance is essentially a private contrac-
tual undertaking. As we shall see, that is not the only notion that
pervades insurance law.
Returning to Henkel, the sundering of Amchem 21 into Amchem No.
1 and Amchem No. 2 was accompanied by a transfer of all "assets,
liabilities and goodwill utilized in its metalworking chemical activi-
ties." 22 This was accepted, unsurprisingly, by Amchem No. 2's newly
20. Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L.
REV. 403, 404 (1985).
21. By its own hand, though one guided surely by Union Carbide.
22. Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 71 (Cal. 2003).
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formed board of directors. 2 3 Interestingly, this was the moment Hen-
kel lost the case. For although this agreement explicitly 24 transferred
contingent tort liabilities, the Henkel court would rule that the liabili-
ties did not transfer by "operation of law." 25 That is, neither the ex-
ceptions described above nor their California variants26 imposed
successor liability on Amchem No. 2 independently of the contractual
allocation. As Henkel succeeded to No. 2, it succeeded to its liabilities
by its explicit choice, not by default.
This is an important constraint on the meaning of "succession."
Successor liability is thus defined by the norms of corporate law-
specifically the contracts transacting parties have struck-rather than
those of tort law. The successor is determined by one set of the inci-
dents of the corporation-ownership interests-rather than others,
such as its activities. When Judge Cardozo gently untied product lia-
bility from privity, he rejected the idea that the obligation to the con-
sumer grew "out of contract and nothing else." 2 7 Instead, the source
of the obligation was "the law," by which he meant the law of torts.2 8
By contrast, the default rule of corporate succession locates the source
of putative successors' tort obligations in the law of contracts.
The first upshot of this move is the interesting result that the most
obviously tort-relevant assets (those in the chemicals business) are
targeted for liability only by the fortuity of the parties' risk allocation
choices. The risks of that business have no independent significance
in evaluating the insurance picture. The possibility that liability insur-
ance coverage should be complementary to actual tort liability was
considered by a plainly skeptical majority in Henkel, but sidestepped,
because the liability here was contractually assumed rather than im-
posed directly by the law of torts.29 At this point, the claims of the
liability system are submerged under the rubric of corporate law.3 0
23. See id.
24. Actually, little is "explicit" in the generic reference to all "assets and liabilities" that often
represents the extent of delineation between the predecessor and successor firms. Determining
what the transacting parties intend is half the problem. The other half involves determining
what they should intend. See id. at 71-72.
25. Id. at 73.
26. California recognizes another exception to the default rule of non-liability. A successor
that continues marketing a predecessor's products may be liable (in a products-liability case) if
the succession resulted in the "virtual destruction" of a plaintiffs remedies. Id. In California,
this would be satisfied only if the predecessor (1) dissolved or was left insolvent or (2) did not
hold liability insurance, as such insurance survives dissolution. Id.
27. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
28. Id.
29. See Henkel, 62 P.3d at 73.
30. This is not necessarily wrong. It makes sense for different bodies of law to rely on the
competences of one system, rather than permitting each system to reinvent the wheel (reshaping
[Vol. 60:573580
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But in another move, the Henkel court inadvertently elevated one
vision of insurance law (the contract model) over both torts and cor-
porate law. If chemicals "liabilities" are transferable by contract,
what is the scope of the "assets" thus transferred? Do they include
assets such as liability insurance policies-assets that would seem par-
ticularly relevant to such a transaction? Although I will explain why
the matter is not free from doubt, let us assume this was indeed the
parties' intention. The Henkel court ruled this irrelevant because
Amchem No. 1 had no authority to transfer this particular asset to No.
2.3
VI. INSURANCE AND ASSIGNMENT
Insurance contracts typically contain language expressly barring as-
signment of the policy by its holder to another without the consent of
the insurer.32 Insurers have an obvious interest in ensuring that the
"risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed," to
borrow a convenient phrase.33 Unauthorized transfers could in theory
permit less risky policyholders to sell insurance rights to more risky
non-policyholders. In exchange for a fee less than the premium by an
insurer-if insurance for the risky actor was available at all-the risky
actor would enjoy a protection for which it has not fully paid. On the
other side of the policy would rest, uneasily, an insurer responsible for
a risk it has not agreed to bear.
Anti-assignment provisions are at their most persuasive under such
circumstances, but these circumstances were not fully present in Hen-
kel. Again, while skeptically describing Henkel's claim that assign-
ment would not harm the insurer here, the court was content merely
to observe that there were two exceptions to a general rule vindicating
anti-assignment language and neither was applicable. 34 Thus, neither
Amchem No. 2 nor Henkel could benefit from the effort to transfer all
chemical business assets of Amchem No. 1.
This analysis thus elevates one aspect of contractual freedom-the
insurer's limitation on assignment-over a second: the ability of cor-
that wheel as its own norms suggest). The point of this Article is that the law should consider
disputes along jurisprudential borders with an eye toward understanding that those borders may
be somewhat indistinct. Relying solely on the lines drawn by one side is unlikely to fairly map
the disputed terrain.
31. See Henkel, 62 P.3d at 74-75.
32. See ROBERT H. JERRY III & DOUGLAs R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
354-55 (4th ed. 2007).
33. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
34. Henkel, 62 P.3d at 76.
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porate actors to allocate property, including intangible property, to
such uses as they see fit.35
Henkel has invited considerable commentary, some academic, much
of it from the professional community of corporate and insurance law-
yers. While the latter category has been unusually informative, it has
characteristically tended to reflect rather well the advocacy positions
easily identified with its various authors.36
Academic dissent from Henkel has come primarily from Professors
Tom Baker and Jeffrey Stempel, who level heavy criticism from the
standpoint of the structure of liability policies and a close examination
of the unfortunate incentives Henkel creates.37 There is considerable
merit in these critiques, and I largely concur with them. However, the
Henkel problem is more complex than I initially thought; I am no
longer certain, as I suspect most insurance professors were, that the
Henkel problem is easily solved merely by appealing to the policies
that underlie modern insurance law.
By deciding the case as it did, the Henkel court dealt with the prob-
lem of liability insurance for corporate succession atomistically. The
opinion reflects an incompletely rationalized approach, partly because
it reaches some wrong conclusions on the discrete problems before it,
but more importantly because it treated them discretely. It is some-
thing of a three-way collision between the system norms sketched
above rather than a pas de trois mediating their respective compe-
tences. And while ballet may be an unrealistic goal given the intrinsi-
cally messy and divergent legal processes at work, Henkel's missteps
offer nothing but room for improvement. To understand whether a
predecessor's liability insurance should be available to a corporate
35. Whether the insurance "asset" is alienable typically turns on whether the insurer's obliga-
tion has emerged from the indefiniteness of risk and hardened into reality. This tracks the dis-
tinction between pre-loss and post-loss transfers of insurance rights. Once a loss has occurred,
an assignment would not ordinarily "materially" increase or change the insurer's duties within
the meaning of Sections 317 and 322 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See 3 RusA-.
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS H§ 317, 322 (1981).
36. See, e.g., Laura A. Foggan & Parker J. Lavin, Successor Liability and Coverage Issues:
Past, Present and Future, WnivY REIN NEWSL., Apr. 2008, at 6, available at http://www.wileyrein.
com/resources/documents/fml4076.pdf; Patrick F. Hofer, Corporate Succession and Insurance
Rights After Henkel: A Return to Common Sense, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 763 (2007);
John T. Waldron III & Andrew R. Stanton, Assignment of Liability Insurance Rights for Latent
Injury and Damage Claims, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 389 (2007); William G. Passannante, An Extreme
Departure, LEGAL INTELUGENCE-R (Mar. 17, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/Pub
ArticleFriendlyPA.jsp?id=900005403680.
37. See Tom Baker et al., Meet Your New Insured: Successors' Rights to Insurance Assets in
Corporate Transactions, 14 COVERAGE 1 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage
Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INs. L.J.
349 (2005).
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successor, it is useful to consider what these three systems have in
common. Quite a bit, it turns out, but their different structures and
methods have tended to obscure this. Each can be understood as a
system for disciplining and allocating risk but with particular regard
for the identity of those risks and their bearers.
VII. WRONGDOING AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
It is interesting that the body of law ostensibly at the heart of the
Henkel decision-the law of torts-was virtually ignored by the court.
Because the Henkel problem simply would not exist in the absence of
tort law-and, indeed, is sharpened by the contours of the particular
tort law we have-we may begin here.
There is no single rationale for the tort system. Readers of John
Goldberg's wonderfully accessible survey of modern tort theory will
likely appreciate how the operation structure and meaning of that sys-
tem have evolved over time.38 Tort law embraces historical and tech-
nological developments and changing social mores; it fits itself to
contemporaneous notions of democracy-notions that have changed
since the arrival of the "modern" tort system in the mid-nineteenth
century. Efforts to reduce its aims to a few simple and unswerving
rules founder, as do some of the more elaborately wrought accounts
of the system's goals. A Rorschach test if ever one there were, the
tort system embraces enough contradictions to reflect whatever the
viewer wishes to see in it. It is useful, then, to recognize that the tort
system serves many functions, though it has often emphasized one or
more modes of thought throughout its history.39
I find it useful to think of torts as a two-track mechanism for regu-
lating and distributing risk, on the one hand, and righting wrongs on
the other. Which is to say, I find it useful for now to ignore features of
the tort system that complicate this simple picture. (This perspective
is utterly congenial to the open textures of the tort system, which is
generally convinced it can have the best of both worlds at all times.)
Although successor liability insurance is a potential problem for any
enterprise, it is particularly problematic for product manufacturers.
And because products-liability law stands at the summit of tort law's
aspirations and embodies most of its flaws and contradictions, this is
the image of the tort system that should guide us.
Owing to the apparent failure of contract law to discipline product
manufacturers, tort law in the mid-twentieth century stepped into the
38. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003).
39. See id.
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breach. 4 0 Tort law rests on notions of moral wrongdoing. Ideally, lia-
bility is matched to those who have acted wrongly regarding the rights
of others. And the amount of liability is, in a well-functioning system,
conveniently tailored to the losses suffered as a result of that wrong-
doing. The result is a restoration of the previous order. And, as a
kind of karmic benefit, this process indirectly disciplines future wrong-
doers by providing a cautionary tale of the wages of wrongdoing.
Law and economics recasts this story somewhat; the discipline could
be primary, and attention to the delicate sensibilities of our moral in-
tuitions merely a harmless salve harvested from the offshoots of an
efficient system for internalization. What is important here is that this
is essentially what strict products liability did, albeit imperfectly. The
problem was not simply the failure of contract law, but the failure of a
negligence-based tort law. Contracts were not useful in disciplining
product manufacturers because those same manufacturers wrote the
contracts that governed their liability. Extra-contractual norms of
tort, while attractive in theory, did not then possess the institutional
confidence to discern wrongdoing in very subtle, if ultimately tragic,
departures from optimum product design and delivery.41 The solu-
tion, offered by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, may well
be described as a "highly successful effort at obfuscation." 4 2 By com-
bining features of both contract and tort, the architects of § 402A cre-
ated a hybrid strict products liability.
The second half of the twentieth century saw the apparent decline
in moral reasoning as a guide to tort liability. This was accompanied
by more expressly instrumentalist reasoning, courtesy of law and eco-
nomics. It was unnecessary as well as wasteful and muddleheaded to
speak of product manufacturers as having "wronged" disappointed
purchasers. Indeed, to some extent, consumers themselves could be
understood as a necessary and morally equivalent (which is to say,
largely morally irrelevant) link in a chain that resulted, unfortunately,
in accident costs from time to time.
40. "The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend on the intricacies of
the law of sales." Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (quoting Ket-
terer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912)).
41. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-43 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that responsibility for unavoidable product harms be fixed "openly,"
without resort to "fiction of negligence").
42. Indeed, it appears to have actually been so described by Professors Henderson and Twer-
ski, though they cannot recall precisely where. See E-mail from Lyndsey Clark, Administrative
Assistant, Cornell Law School, to Adam Scales, author (Apr. 13, 2009, 10:38 EST) (on file with
the DePaul Law Review).
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The products-liability system could thus resemble a default system
of insurance. Unlike a system for voluntary contribution (and selec-
tion of risk), the tort system automatically provided potentially unlim-
ited coverage for such items as medical expense, pain and suffering,
emotional loss, and property damage. This was the "policy." The
"premiums" for this coverage, which tort law rarely permitted con-
sumers to decline, were automatically collected by the prudent manu-
facturer as an unacknowledged item within the cost of the product.
The "risk pool" consisted of all the product's consumers, and the
beauty of this was that accident costs would be borne by those who
had created them: initially, the inadequately performing manufac-
turer; secondarily, the risk-bearing public whose desire for the product
had in some sense created the risk as well.
Naturally, such a system would generate feedback in the form of
liability, which could be moderated by ever-wiser product design and
purchasing decisions. Although the system would never be self-exe-
cuting, broad construction of the term "defective" would ensure that
the product choices would be forced to reckon with the wide swath of
harms that are regrettably an unavoidable incident of a risk-infested
society.
The above description, stripped to the essence of what a system of
strict liability is thought to require, has little to say about justice. Be-
yond a certain distaste for the inefficiency of suboptimal investments
in care, the strict liability system as courts and torts scholars in the
1950s began to re-imagine it was not conventionally about right and
wrong.43 In theory, liability could be distributed on an insurance-
based rationale: a risk exists, and here are the parties the system has
selected to bear it.44
Even to offer this synopsis with the reservations accorded to broad
generalizations is to invite ridicule. Few courts and scholars today
maintain that a system of tort law devoid of moral considerations is
conceptually stable or desirable. But for a time, this seemed both pos-
sible and desirable-indeed, an improvement over the fractured
processes of common law negligence. 45 Thus, while time and experi-
ence would unveil the impossibility of severing moral judgment en-
tirely from tort law (even if the exact specifications of those judgments
43. See, e.g., ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE Wrniour FAULT 16 (1951); Priest, supra
note 3, at 7-8.
44. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STu[. 29, 31 (1972)
("Characterization of the negligence standard as moral or moralistic does not advance
analysis.").
45. See VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY:
RE-THINKING TORT REF'om FOR THE TwErY-FIRST CENTURY 94-95 (1995).
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could in fact shift over time), 46 the products-liability system strove to
fulfill the aspirations of a doctrine "pridefully fashioned and nur-
tured" by (ironically, in hindsight) the California Supreme Court and
other leaders of the strict liability revolution. 47
VIII. IDENTITY, LIABILITY, AND TIME
A. A Torts Story
The conceptual difficulty of coordinating corporate law and the lia-
bility system is illustrated by the diethylstilbestrol (DES) cases. For
several decades, over two hundred manufacturers separately mar-
keted diethylstilbestrol to pregnant women for control of nausea and
other complications. In the 1970s, the Food and Drug Administration
realized that DES use caused uterine tumors in daughters born to
women taking the drug. In a twist that would have endeared DES
cases to tort professors even without subsequent doctrinal develop-
ments, these tumors were not detectable until the victims hit puberty,
ensuring that this would present a classic problem of long-tailed
liability. 48
That problem was complicated by the failure (inconceivable by the
standards of modern pharmaceutical economics) to patent DES,
which led to the multiplicity of manufacturers. 49 The passage of time
(complicating individualized determinations of responsibility), the
manifestly shoddy commitment to women's health, and an almost
uniquely sympathetic plaintiff population led a number of courts to
fashion creative approaches to causation. And the most creative of
these was market-share liability.50
46. See David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law: Paths Taken and Untaken in
the New Restatement, 61 TENN. L. Riev. 1241, 1253 (1994) (describing how the meaning of
"strict" liability has shifted towards a theoretically impure but "realistic" midpoint between neg-
ligence and strict liability).
47. This will be remembered as the dark day when this court, which heroically took the
lead in originating the doctrine of products liability and steadfastly resisted efforts to
inject concepts of negligence into the newly designed tort inexplicably turned 180 de-
grees and beat a hasty retreat almost back to square one. The pure concept of products
liability so pridefully fashioned and nurtured by this court for the past decade and a
half is reduced to a shambles.
Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1181 (Cal. 1978) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted) (criticizing application of comparative fault rules to strict products-liability cases).
48. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
49. DES Update: Health Care Providers, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/des/hcp/nurses/history.
html (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
50. This story, which I thought I knew well, is given new life in Anita Bernstein, Hymowitz v.
Eli Lilly and Co.: Markets of Mothers, in ToRrs SToRIEs 151 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 2003).
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It is probably no accident that this creativity flowered at the peak of
the tort system's period of self-confidence-the late 1970s and early
1980s. A system devoted to the refinement of human behavior and a
restless search for justice without undue regard for form-the essence
of the amorphous "reasonableness" standard-is unlikely to be long
deterred by matters of procedure. By and large, market-share liability
has been confined to the unique facts of the DES cases.51 These cases
are of course interesting for their willingness to decouple liability from
wrongdoing across a set of wrongdoers. But that is not how I wish to
use them here. We think of market-share liability as a mechanism for
attributing responsibility across "horizontal" wrongdoers-a group of
bad actors who act roughly at the same time with respect to any par-
ticular tort claim. But consider retelling the DES story as a tale of
"vertical" wrongdoing.
One of the most striking aspects of the DES cases is the imposition
of liability on companies that, due to intervening corporate succes-
sions, were not really the same companies that had marketed DES to
the plaintiffs. 52 The connection was even more attenuated where the
defendant purchased a company that itself had succeeded to an actual
DES manufacturer.53 Of course, some DES defendants were, nomi-
nally, manufacturers themselves, but not in a sense easily fitted to the
ideals of the liability system. Most of the principals, managers, re-
searchers, and marketers were retired or dead. Stockholders had un-
doubtedly been cycled for hundreds of "generations," making it
extremely unlikely that liability would be matched to critical periods
of ownership.
In itself, this confounds the aspirations of both strict and negli-
gence-based liability. To the extent that liability is intended to signal
and deter inadequate conduct, DES liability resembles the back-
ground radiation detectable as the vestiges of some cosmic event eons
ago. Few managers in the 1980s and 1990s would have perceived the
lessons of DES liability in terms more useful than, "Don't market
DES without adequate testing during the 1950s." It would appear to
have little relevance to the potential lapses in marketing of the block-
buster drugs then under development. In other words, DES liability
51. "Attempts to extend the market-share approach beyond DES cases have been almost en-
tirely rejected." James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, PRooucrs LIABILITY: PROBLEMS
AND PROCESS 139 (6th ed. 2008).
52. See Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 387-89 (Wash. 1984) (adopting a "product line"
theory of successor liability in the DES context).
53. CHILTON DAVIS VARNE7R & ANDREW T. BAYMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL
MANUFACTURERS § 6.01 (2010) (observing that complex corporate history and structures of
pharmaceutical companies create difficult issues of product responsibility).
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promises deterrence in the most general of ways-namely, that there
exists a liability system which, given enough time and an unusually
influential student note,54 may track your corporate descendants down
decades later. This is unlikely to stimulate much reflection.
Interestingly, the same is true for the other side of the coin. The
risk-spreading rationale behind strict liability posits that the manufac-
turer will serve as a conduit, channeling liabilities to those presumably
uninjured consumers who benefited from a poorly designed product.
That they indeed benefit as a class is clear, because most people will
not be injured by any but the most palpably worthless products. The
uninjured consumer thus pays an artificially low price; it reflects
neither design changes that would prevent injuries to others nor the
costs of those injuries. Strict liability corrects this, but only in theory.
To see why, imagine a defective lawnmower. The mower omits
warnings as to proper placement of the user's hands or lacks a guard
that would keep those hands well away from danger. Strict liability
transfers liability from unfortunate users to purchasers of lawnmowers
generally. But this will never actually happen. Even a relatively
speedy tort system (we obviously speak hypothetically) will eventually
channel liability only to those who purchase lawnmowers years later.
The original purchasers, oblivious to the potential for hand injuries,
pay the price uncorrected by tort liability.55 And by the time the lia-
bility channel is open, new purchasers will often be selecting products
that differ from their antecedents. At the low end, the relevant flaws
may have been corrected (undoubtedly making room for flaws yet to
be discovered). Or newfangled lawnmowers may bear only a slight
relationship to previous models.
54. See Bernstein, supra note 33, at 165-66 (describing the evolution of a Fordham Law Re-
view student note developing market-share apportionment, subsequently relied upon by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Sindell).
55. It is tempting to suggest that the "insurance premium" implicit in the exercise of tort law
will become an explicit transfer between the manufacturer and its liability insurer. That is, won't
early lawnmower purchasers be forced to internalize the cost of product hazards through higher
prices, even though those risks may not materialize for years? The answer is yes and no. In
time-though not as quickly or linearly as liability-creating courts supposed-insurance products
evolved to deal with newly created liability risks. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, TiHE LIABILffY
CENTURY: INSURANCE ANi) Toir LAW FROM TIE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 152-63 (2008).
However, for many products, particularly new ones, insurers can merely guess at the expected
loss history. It takes decades of experience for, say, robotic lawnmowers to exhibit loss charac-
teristics that permit them to be clearly distinguished from "lawnmowers" or "home power tools"
or similar general categories. And by the time that experience is earned, manufacturers will
have likely incorporated new technologies that confound reliance on existing data. I do not
suggest that the task is impossible-perhaps a rough justice could be achieved over time-but
strict liability proponents tended to assume that it was easier than proved to be the case.
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This is also true of DES defendants. By the 1980s and 1990s, when
market-share liability cleared the way for substantial payouts to DES
victims, there were no longer any DES purchasers among whom liabil-
ity might be distributed. And, there would not have been many origi-
nal DES stockholders, whose holdings would in a just world have
been diminished by the expected value of liabilities. Who remained?
Producers and consumers of anti-depressants, cholesterol-lowering
medication, impotence drugs, and the myriad inventions of modern
pharmacology.56 It is obviously impossible for these parties to spread
the risks of 1950s misconduct in the conventional sense of horizontal
risk distribution in which all share in a "community of fate."57
It will be obvious that these situations likewise severely complicate
the tort system's generalized aspiration to identify and sanction
wrongdoing. The period of experimentation with faultless liability
that began in the 1960s gradually gave way to the realization that
wrongdoing remains central to tort law, regardless of the precise lan-
guage used to describe it.58 It is central because, untethered to no-
tions such as fault (even broad notions), liability cannot be described,
contained, or adjudicated in a principled manner.59 Fault can be rede-
fined-what is "wrongful" on the part of a corporate actor today is
certainly a different and broader concept from what was "wrongful"
fifty years ago. But something like "fault" lies beneath the fog of
words surrounding strict liability. 60
What does it mean to say that a defendant in 2010 acted "wrong-
fully" fifty years earlier? The question is subtle. It does not simply
refer to changing standards of conduct, although that is itself an inter-
esting and worthy question to pursue. Instead, it asks whether the
defendant presently before us is the same actor whose conduct we
wish to examine. Statutes of limitation aside, we rarely consider this
question in the case of individuals. As moving as we may find testi-
mony about how the individual has changed, perhaps in response to
the very acts for which we seek punishment,61 such changes are irrele-
56. This critique could be applied to a variety of long-tailed claims, but DES liability puts the
matter poignantly.
57. Of course, the later manufacturers and consumers are part of a "vertical," or temporal risk
distribution chain. This possibility, a feature of the products-liability system that only emerged
over time, underscores the importance of insurance arrangements that survive successive itera-
tions of products, corporate defendants, and consumers.
58. See Owen, supra note 46, at 1253.
59. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L.
REv. 377 (2002).
60. See Owen, supra note 46, at 1253.
61. Not a day goes by I don't feel regret, not because I'm in here or because you think I
should. I look back on the way I was then, a young stupid kid who committed that
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vant to the question of liability or guilt; they may at most be taken
into account at the punishment stage.
The notion of responsibility at the heart of tort law rests fundamen-
tally on the implicit assumption that liability ought to be matched to
the wrongdoer. The assumption is so basic that it rarely requires
thought, let alone explication. Therefore, it tends to receive attention
only at the margins of liability law. Whether the issue is market-share
apportionment, joint and several liability, or vicarious responsibility,
these are usually treated as minor tweaks or interpretive conventions
to a rule that is rarely challenged. And for the vast majority of cases,
there is no reason to challenge it. A case may pose questions about
the precise fit between the actor's conduct and the injury, or even
about the rules used to instantiate liability. We may, of course, won-
der about identity in the conventional sense: whether the defendant
before the court-as opposed to someone else who might be nearby-
actually "did it." But the unacknowledged premise is that we can eas-
ily demonstrate that the relationship between the wrongdoer and the
liability owner is one of essential identity.
That central assumption was challenged by the way tort law evolved
in the 1960s, though fittingly, it took some time for this challenge to
manifest itself. Many aspects of tort law are "polycentric," to borrow
from Professors Henderson and Twerski. 62 For example, the archi-
tects of comparative fault imagined that the result of reform would be
the simple elimination of "false negatives" generated by a liability sys-
tem that purported to exclude recovery where plaintiffs were even
trivially at fault. Reform did indeed do so. Reformers did not appre-
ciate, however, that comparative fault would tend to draw in ever-
more marginal cases along with the deserving ones wrongly excluded
by a contributory fault regime.63 This altered the mix of cases
presented to the tort system and over time altered the meaning of
"fault" in significant ways. Previously, a minor contributor to an acci-
dent-the imperfectly constant gardener responsible for trimming
hedges near a busy intersection, perhaps-would have been "invisi-
ble" to a tort system accustomed to making only rough, binary judg-
ments about liability. But once the grammar of tort was expanded to
terrible crime. I want to talk to him. I want to try to talk some sense to him. Tell him
the way things are. But I can't. That kid's long gone, this old man is all that's left, I got
to live with that.
TiHE SIIAWSHANK REDEMVI-ON (Castle Rock Entertainment 1994).
62. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. RIv. 1263, 1305 (1991).
63. See generally Michael D. Green, The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative Negligence:
Superseding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. Riv. 1103 (2002).
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permit construction of claims involving small percentages of fault,
courts were freed to explore what "fault" writ small might look like.
Products liability exhibits something similar for two reasons that are
particularly relevant to product and environmental claims. First, such
claims often take a long time to mature and present themselves. As I
assure my students, the legal system will be dealing with asbestos lia-
bilities for most of their careers, even though domestic asbestos use
dropped to nearly zero over thirty years ago.M Moreover, the system
for evaluating that liability has changed remarkably-not just in the
relatively short span since 1965, but over the course of more than a
century in some cases. 65 That is itself interesting, but more important
is that this long-tail effect exposes something interesting about virtu-
ally all products-liability defendants: they are corporations. And cor-
porations change over time.
This possibility, which hardens into certainty given enough time, is
uneasily accounted for by tort law. If one emphasizes the instrumen-
talist, loss-spreading rationale of strict liability, it will often be difficult
to distinguish the channel selected by the tort system (the firm in its
present incarnation selling products bearing perhaps a slight relation-
ship to the defective ones and sold to a different generation of con-
sumers) from other equally plausible risk-bearing candidates.
Although firms, like individuals, can learn from their mistakes, they
are as likely to simply evolve away from those mistakes, changing
structure in response to significant tort exposure. 66 The liability-insu-
lating character of those structures makes tort deterrence less plausi-
ble than would be ideal.
These points possess even greater force if one imagines the tort sys-
tem as a vehicle for righting wrongs, declaring moral responsibility,
and giving victims the opportunity to face those who harmed them.
64. Relatedly, the system will do so in the context of insurance policies written decades ago,
before asbestos risks were well understood by the liability system.
65. "This case presents something of a time capsule in that nineteenth century technology
polluting twentieth century properties will have significant twenty first century financial ramifi-
cations." Consol. Edison Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 688 (N.Y. 2002) (considering
claims first brought in 1995 against insurers writing coverage from 1936-1986 for pollution oc-
curring from 1873-1933). Incidentally, this polluting activity was undertaken by the policy-
holder's "corporate predecessors." Id.
66. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. RIv. 1 (1986). Roe
suggests plausible reasons why firms may find liability-spurred evolution-perhaps one should
say "intelligent design"-more difficult than I suggest. Simply put, the incentives of the relevant
actors within the firm cause the existing structure (instead of a bankruptcy liquidation) to be
"sticky." In the context of Roe's example-an identifiable mass tort-he is probably correct.
However, many products-liability claims are slow-moving, and will accordingly permit less dra-
matic reorganizations that nonetheless leave contingent tort creditors with few remedies.
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By the time liability strikes, many of those who acted or gained
wrongfully will be gone. This will be true even without substantial
changes in the corporation's form. Even if one invests the corporate
form with the moral agency we demand of natural persons,67 the firm
responding to long-tailed liabilities can say, with a wink that is one
part Proteus, one part Shaggy, "It wasn't me." 68
In sum, just as strict liability proponents miscalculated the availabil-
ity and responsiveness of the liability insurance system to the new tort
regime, 69 they did not adequately prepare for the mutations of corpo-
rate law-a law entwined with the overwhelming majority of prod-
ucts-liability cases. When the problem arose in force, tort law was
forced to cast about for a solution. It found one to borrow, and im-
provised further, but the results have been uneven.
IX. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY: THE EXCEPTION WITHIN A RULE
A. Contract Origins and Limitations
Successor liability is one of those problems that seems as if it should
have been solved by now. For one thing, it is relatively unusual for a
tort claim to be derailed on the basis that it is properly addressed to a
predecessor. Most tort claims do not have long tails. However, there
is a significant body of case law on the subject. And there has been
significant commentary, though this has tended to arise when the issue
is percolating. 70 I suspect that the issue has attracted less attention
than other seemingly minor debates within tort law for two reasons:
tort academics know relatively little about corporate law, and corpo-
rate law is generally unconcerned with the vagaries of torts. This sen-
timent expresses itself fully in the general disregard corporate law has
for the norms of the tort system.71 Regrettably, the feeling is mutual.
67. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Corporate Law, 50
wASI. & LEE L. REv. 1477 (1993) (rejecting a narrow view of corporations as economic ma-
chines properly devoid of moral agency and responsibility). For a more wide-ranging analysis of
the law's treatment of entities as moral agents, with special attention to the problem of identity
across time, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Histori-
cal Injustices, 103 Coi~um. L. Riv. 689 (2003).
68. SHAGGY, IT WAsN'r ME (Geffen Records 2000).
69. See AnRAIAM, supra note 55, at 160-62 (describing the misplaced assumption by judges
that newly created product liabilities would fit neatly into an extant liability insurance system).
70. By the late 1970s, products-liability cases were maturing enough to implicate successor
liability issues; after the 2003 Henkel decision, the insurance question was placed firmly on the
table as well.
71. In thinking aloud about this with a corporate law scholar, I was struck by his remark that
tort liability simply is not a significant feature of corporate transactions most of the time. I had
suggested that it was odd one could read Barbarians at the Gate (the definitive account of the
RJR-Nabisco leveraged buyout of the 1980s) and find no evidence that parties were pricing in
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The structure of the corporation-its very genius-permits the
functional aggregation but legal segregation of many of the functions
incident to industry. For our purposes, the most relevant of these are
the actors who are liable, the assets with which those liabilities might
be satisfied, and the metaphysical location of that liability. We place
to one side, for now, the role of liability insurance.
Few firms are organized, one presumes, with the goal of creating
tort liability. But all firms must expect to incur liabilities in the course
of business; incorporation allows those liabilities to be cabined within
the firm (and whatever assets it possesses). And the assets available
to satisfy those liabilities may be drained away in the form of perfectly
innocuous dividend payments or other distributions to shareholders.
This method can be optimized with the creation of subsidiaries de-
voted particularly to debt- or liability-generating activities. 72
There is nothing inherently wrong with this. It is in fact one of the
signal virtues of corporate law. Risk-taking is encouraged (by limiting
downside risk), and capital may be directed with ever greater granu-
larity as the distinctive competence of individual units becomes clear.
Whether limited liability optimally balances the need for risk-taking
with the potential harm of externalities does not appear to be a ques-
tion that can be answered empirically.73 What is clear, however, is the
tension between limited liability and tort law.
Tort liability is premised on the idea that responsibility for wrong-
doing can be directed toward someone able to pay despite the occa-
sional insolvency (or liability insurance "damage cap"). 74 This works
well most of the time in the case of corporate actors, who have incen-
tives to remain sufficiently liquid to make routine tort judgments as
collectible as routine debt payments.7 5  But, when push comes to
shove and an outsized liability looms on the horizon, corporate law
potential tort liabilities. Even twenty years ago, this would not have been an insignificant con-
cern for a tobacco company. However, as an insurance professor, I should have known better:
liability costs account for a tiny portion of firm revenues most of the time. The broader signifi-
cance of my colleague's observation was that the world does not, in fact, revolve around the
liability system-much as the system's enthusiasts, and detractors, might suggest otherwise.
72. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 20-23 (1996).
73. Accord David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits
of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1317 (2007).
74. Most tort settlements are governed by the extent of available insurance coverage rather
than simply an abstract calculation of the expected outcome of a case. In products-liability cases,
this dynamic still holds true, but is qualified by the size of the firm (and not all products cases
involve corporate behemoths) and whether the liability is a historical one (in which the insur-
ance policy may be all that remains).
75. See James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's The
Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363 (1998).
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offers opportunities for the reorganization of assets away from liabil-
ity, a kind of reverse phototrophy.
Contract creditors have a number of tools with which to protect
themselves from defaulting corporations. They can demand security
and higher rates of interest. Or they can purchase insurance products
(such as the the now infamous credit-default swap) that can mitigate
the risks that the insulation afforded by the corporate firm will tempt
counterparties to default. There is widespread agreement on this
point, which incidentally may justify a bankruptcy regime that nudges
contract creditors toward self-protection, although there is room for
doubt.76
It is therefore ironic that the rules that govern imposition of liability
upon corporate successors reflect the need to protect contract credi-
tors, not tort claimants. They can be and have been stretched to in-
clude tort claimants, but the fit is uneven for reasons owing to their
origin in corporate law rather than tort.77 Successor liability has been
described as a "[t]ort [e]xception to a [c]orporate [r]ule." 78 A better
formulation would be a tort exception within a corporate rule.
Corporate successions can assume an infinite variety of forms. Hen-
kel, surprisingly, involved a relatively straightforward series of trans-
actions. Simplifying, if a purchaser and seller wish to structure a
transaction in which the purchaser alone will carry on the essential
functions of the seller, there are two principal routes79 that can be said
to result in a "succession." First, the parties could agree to a statutory
merger. Relatedly, the parties could effect a de facto merger, which
evades the statutory requirement of due process for minority share-
holders. This device has been appropriated for use by creditors who
would be frustrated if the ongoing functions did not amount to a true
succession.80 Under either scenario, the successor is the predecessor:
it succeeds by law to all that the predecessor possessed or owed to
others. In a world governed solely by formal mergers, the law of torts
76. See Milton, supra note 73, at 1318-24 (summarizing research suggesting endowment ef-
fects from limited liability may produce net subsidy for firms, notwithstanding contract creditors'
presumed ability to bargain to a pre-limitation equilibrium).
77. See Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 385 (Wash. 1984) (noting emerging judicial
recognition that successor liability rules "protect commercial creditors, [but] they ... leave the
products liability plaintiff without a remedy").
78. Roberta L. Schuhalter, Note, Successor Liability for Defective Products: A Tort Exception
to a Corporate Rule, 10 HoI.STRA L. Rjv. 831 (1982).
79. 1 describe broad pathways only; the specifics of triangular mergers, reverse triangular
mergers, and similarly geometric operations on the corporate form are unnecessary to consider
here. For a helpful illustration of these fascinating elevations of form over substance, see Binder
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., 184 F. Supp. 2d 762, 771-72 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
80. See Schuhalter, supra note 78, at 840.
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would be relatively indifferent to the precise form contracting parties
wish to assume.81 Curiously, insurance law would be similarly indif-
ferent, and this indifference comes at the price of conceptual consis-
tency once more complicated transactions are considered.8 2
B. Assets and Liability
But precisely because mergers inevitably bring the bad with the
good, parties find it attractive to separate the two, leading to the alter-
native route. This is the modestly named mechanism of the "asset
purchase." If the putative successor merely purchases the assets of the
"predecessor," there is no identity between the parties, and thus liabil-
ity does not automatically flow from one to the other.83 Assets, after
all, are not persons, even within the generous fiction of corporate exis-
tence. Thus they cannot be invested with the encumbrances that at-
tach to legal personality.
Like a number of liability questions that arise from the corporate
form, this will often be of trivial import. No one supposes that a ware-
house-one of hundreds, for example-owned by a trucking firm
ought to carry with it the stain of its owner's torts, thus preventing it
from being taken free and clear in an arm's-length transaction. Such
discrete sales rarely implicate tort system concerns. However, asset-
purchase agreements are a common vehicle for transferring the lion's
share, if not the entirety, of a firm to one or more purchasers, particu-
larly in closely held firms. This includes the physical plant, goodwill,
intellectual property, and so forth. Even the employees will often con-
tinue doing the exact same work, just under a different corporate um-
brella. Without a rule imposing liability, the assets would flow in one
direction, while the liability drained away. The asset sale thus repre-
sents the corporate liability form of "regulatory arbitrage," in which
economically identical transactions are varied trivially so that they
may be characterized under a less burdensome regulatory regime
(mergers that transfer liability automatically versus asset sales that do
81. That is, tort law is as well served by the application of de facto merger doctrine as contract
law. And because the doctrine is a creature of corporate law (rather than a tort-oriented excep-
tion engrafted upon it), there is no real conflict among the systems here. Of course, a merger
effected in order to evade liability-by excavating the value of the firm en route to its relocation
into the hands of another-is a matter of concern for the tort system. That concern is met,
inadequately, by the doctrine of fraudulent conveyance.
82. See infra Parts XII, XIII.
83. See Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying New
York law). A successor corporation could be an existing firm, or a newly created one. In prac-
tice, it tends to be a newly created subsidiary of an existing firm. In either case, merger extin-
guishes the predecessor as a separate entity, but does not extinguish its liabilities and
entitlements-these are the elements to which the new firm succeeds.
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not). Flexibility is a desirable feature of corporate law, but competing
claims counsel careful policing of the substance-form border. Succes-
sor liability law attempts to do so.
Successor liability doctrine considers whether the asset sale (or
other transaction) conveys characteristics of the predecessor sufficient
to impute its identity to the putative successor. Sometimes the impu-
tation formally considers the attributes of identity, looking toward the
continuity of key personnel and shareholders. 84 In the products con-
text that concerns us most, some courts have examined whether the
successor continued the same line of products-usually, the line which
the plaintiff now claims is defective-and therefore may fairly be an-
swerable for the predecessor's torts.85 At the bottom of these inquir-
ies is the often unstated assumption that there exists an entity to
which moral blame should attach, and corporate law legerdemain
should not delay the imposition of responsibility: somewhere under-
neath all this paper lies the wrongdoer.8 6
The merger-centric variants of successor liability at least fit well
conceptually with corporate law. Liability following a former merger
is easy to digest. Even de facto merger (a creature of corporate law
originally designed to protect shareholders) and "mere continuation"
theories may be understood as reflecting the resistance of any body of
law to evasion of its own norms.87 But product line continuity is dif-
84. The "mere continuation" exception to successor non-liability examines the extent to which
the old firm is simply doing business in a new form. Many of these considerations are intramural
to the transaction-the disposition of assets and business operations, for example-while others
include incidents external to the transaction, such as whether the successor "holds itself out" as
the continuation of the predecessor. Smith v. Grattan Family Enters. L.L.C., No. 08-CV-14314,
2009 WL 536454, at *7 n.4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2009). Such representational conduct is often
required for a business to continue under a different name. And it creates, at least among con-
tract creditors, an expectation of financial responsibility notwithstanding intramural changes.
85. See, e.g., George W. Kuney, Jerry Phillips' Product Line Continuity and Successor Corpo-
ration Liability: Where Are We Twenty Years Later?, 72 TENN. L. Riev. 777 (2005); Jerry J. Phil-
lips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U.L. Riv. 906 (1983).
86. "The original tortfeasor may have been reorganized into unrecognizability, but the injuries
it caused remain." Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 861 N.E.2d 109, 120 (2006) (Pfei-
fer, J., dissenting).
87. In gracious comments given at the Symposium presentation of this Article, Professor An-
drew Gold gently suggested that the de facto merger doctrine is not as beloved within corporate
law as I might imagine. He suggests that the "independent legal significance" test described in
Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc. 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963), which is more respectful of
transactional form, is more widely accepted. See Jeff Goetz, Note, A Dissent Dampened by Tim-
ing: How the Stock Market Exception Systematically Deprives Public Shareholders of Fair Value,
15 FORDHAM iJ. CORP. & FIN. L. 771, 780 n.29 (2010) (describing widespread rejection of de facto
merger doctrine in favor of the independent significance test). This suggestion is well taken, but
this doctrine does not appear to have shaped the emergence of successor liability law. Cf.Turner
v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 887-92 (Mich. 1976) (Coleman, J., dissenting) (urging
rejection of imposition of successor liability via de facto merger doctrine). However, the revital-
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ferent. It focuses on activities-tort-generating activities-and im-
putes to them a legal personality that is separate from, and can thus
survive the dissolution of, the corporation itself.*8 This is a congenial
outcome for the risk-regulation/distribution dimension of the tort sys-
tem. Broadened liability offers greater assurance of compensation for
victims, supports deterrence, and attempts to channel liabilities to risk
creators and their enablers.
It is less obvious that the wrongdoing/recourse dimension of tort
liability is served. Tort justice across the expanse of time may offer,
on reflection, little satisfaction for those supporting the idea of naming
and shaming one's wrongdoers. However, I suspect that just as tort
instrumentalists were less concerned with sedulously attending to
"right" and "wrong" with respect to accident risks, corrective justice
theorists-who are certainly concerned with right and wrong-do not
appear to have focused attention on a law that attaches meaning to
tort-generating activities that themselves have no identity within cor-
porate law. 89
ized regard for corporate form in the shareholders' rights context in which the Hariton rule is
generally applied supplies another explanation for judicial hesitancy to broadly invoke the de
facto merger doctrine in the products-liability context. See, e.g., Binder v. Bristol-Myers Squibb,
Co., 184 F. Supp. 2d 762 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (applying Delaware law).
88. "[L]iberal successor liability was fashioned ... in which the courts reified the liability as
being imposed on a product line or business operation. Of course, liability can only be imposed
on people . . . ." Michael D. Green, Successors and CERCLA: The Imperfect Analogy to Prod-
ucts Liability and an Alternative Proposal, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 897, 910 n.72 (1993). Professor
Green's point is, as always, well-taken. However, two observations become relevant when con-
sidering the corporate-liability complex as a whole. First, this reification is precisely the kind of
move one would expect from a liability system, particularly one evolving fitfully towards the
decoupling of liability from moral agents. A system that examines the content of a product's
character-rather than its creator-is likely to find independent meaning in that creation wher-
ever it looks. Secondly, liability insurance law also reifies entities that corporate law would oth-
erwise deprive of existence. Liability insurance is typically available to unincorporated divisions
of a firm, as well as dissolved corporations. These liability-system responses may be inelegant
(and seemingly misdirected from the corporate-law perspective), but there is something to be
learned from the fact that the liability system has found them necessary to make.
89. The issues of justice and identity across time have received attention in the reparations
context, but claims against a present government for the sins of its previous iterations implicate
more complex considerations than corporate succession. Even with respect to reparations claims
against long-lived corporations, the problem of reparations is bigger than corporate law or tort.
Reparations claims implicate foundational questions about legal institutions, questions that are
severely complicated by the enormous passage of time-a span that is essentially unknown in the
liability system's capacity to match wrongdoing and liability. By comparison, long-tailed prod-
ucts and environmental claims are relatively simple, and presently comprehended within existing
liability law. In short, while resolving the tensions created by adjudicating tort liabilities across
decades of corporate reorganization may be instructive in thinking about reparations claims, it
cannot resolve the unique problems of reparations.
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C. The Underlying Tension
Two phenomena complicate the picture further. The first is that as
products liability became formally-though never completely-un-
moored from moral fault, courts were asked to extend liability to
ever-wider circles of potentially responsible parties.90 Imposing liabil-
ity on an informal successor to a firm that manufactured a defective
product decades earlier is a wide circle indeed. And just as tort law's
growth phase was coming to a close, courts were faced with the task of
imposing long-tailed liabilities on firms that were merely. shadows of
their former incarnations. Courts were often reluctant to do so, and I
suggest that, as occurred at other "stopping points" across the broad
frontier of strict liability, courts could not fundamentally exorcise the
specter of moral fault from their deliberations here. In short, wide-
spread liability for successors seemed unfair precisely because there
appeared to be an insufficient identity between the (bad) predecessor
and the (innocent) successor.91
The other phenomenon is more interesting. Successor liability gives
corporate law headaches for the same reason that veil-piercing gives
corporate law scholars headaches. It is so untidy and freakish. Suc-
cessful piercing efforts are "[1]ike lightning . . . rare, severe, and un-
principled." 92 The factors employed by courts in these cases amount
to nothing more than an "unweighted laundry list." 9 3 Piercing, like
successor liability, often turns on "rarely defined" notions such as "in-
justice" and "unfairness." 9 4  Successor liability, as sporadically prac-
ticed, reflects "vague [and] untestable pronouncements," suggesting a
"boundless" liability on asset values without due regard for "the deli-
cate balance of risk and reward among claimants against an enter-
prise."95 The many factors that govern veil piercing-Professor
Bainbridge counts "[n]o fewer than 20 separate (albeit overlapping)
90. For example, although relatively few companies manufactured asbestos, claims have been
brought against approximately 8,400 companies, each bearing some relationship, however atten-
uated, to the asbestos exposures of millions of claimants.
91. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Christopher L. Frost, Successor Liability for Defective Prod-
ucts: A Redesign Ongoing, 72 BROOK. L. Ri-v. 1173, 1199-1206 (2007) (noting judicial and aca-
demic hesitance to apply successor liability on fairness grounds).
92. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
Cim. L. Riv. 89, 89 (1985).
93. Millon, supra note 73, at 1330.
94. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 36-47 (deploying every conceivable synonym for
judicial imprecision while criticizing the "highly fact-specific" rules governing veil piercing).
95. Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 Hoi.sTRA L. Riv. 745, 789-94
(2003). Reilly suggests that a properly tailored fraudulent conveyance theory is a superior basis
for successor liability than the continuity-based theories I have described.
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factors, many of which have multiple sub-factors" 96-conspire to
"keep[] people in the dark about the legal consequences of their
acts"; results often seem conclusory and based on the court's instinc-
tive reaction to the morality of the defendant's conduct.9 7
I could go on, but by now it should be obvious what these observa-
tions are really about: the tort system.
These criticisms have the virtue of being somewhat true. It is easier
in retrospect to determine how a particular defendant fell into liability
trouble than it is to predict in advance whether it will. Corporate law's
structural critique of tort law reflects the divergent ways in which they
settle their respective functions of channel risk.
Corporate transactions are undertaken to redistribute the risks and
rewards of corporate activity. Just as incorporation itself rests on the
edifice of legal separation among the constituents of the firm, reorga-
nizations-whether they be mergers, spinoffs, or partial asset sales-
require a level of certainty for transacting parties to be confident that
the law will attach to their efforts their intended meaning. This is an
entirely prospective analysis. Potential liabilities, which are nearly al-
ways incipient for any risk-generating organization, can be relocated
to structures that are either best fitted to handle them or are simply
far removed from prized assets. The goal of such planning is to bend
liabilities around the structures the parties create.
Tort law works in precisely the opposite fashion. It is retroactive,
attaching meaning to terms struck in the past. Although there are
standards throughout tort law, voluntary transactions such as corpo-
rate reorganizations depend on rules. One might gently suggest that
liability-evading strategies imply a more robust remit for the wide-
ranging processes of the common law. But it is unsurprising that cor-
porate actors-in many ways the true constituency of corporate law-
would not see things that way.9 8 Instead of the privately held desires
of transacting parties, tort law reflects public norms. Doctrinally, it is
the very inverse of the typical liability-channeling reorganization,
which is relatively indifferent to externalities (such as the possible un-
collectibility of tort creditors' claims); tort law, even in its
noneconomic formulations, imposes a broad responsibility for the
consequences of action. The processes of tort law are incremental; the
system continuously assimilates information to refashion itself. This is
96. Bainbridge, supra note 15, at 40-41 (citing Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co.,
26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813-15 (Cal. App. 1962)).
97. Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 414 (7th Cir. 1988).
98. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 15.
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truly a strength of the system, but the open texture of tort standards
will often resemble the articulation of post facto rules.
It would be a mistake to describe the collision between corporate
and tort law as one between an impenetrable object and an irresistible
force (and difficult to determine which is which). But the precise
means for coordinating the two systems' aims and methods has never
been satisfactorily articulated. From the corporate law perspective,
nothing (short of fraud, perhaps) should inhibit the unhindered move-
ment of capital, and tort liability can be a significant hindrance in-
deed.99 From the torts perspective, the concept of the corporate form
itself is suspect; how can a system of civil recourse possibly respect a
body of law designed to evade reckoning wherever it is possible (and,
we are told, efficient) to do so?
An irony of this disagreement is that tort and corporate law seem
equally convinced of their powers to wipe clean the slate of decisions
taken previously. The ability to direct assets away from liability at-
tests to corporate law's ability to provide a bankruptcy-like "fresh
start" to operations stained by potential liabilities. Likewise, the tort
system is accustomed to examining transactions from the perspective
of omniscience; it offers few specifics to warn the wrongdoer at the
time of decision. By the time of trial, the system inevitably glances
sideways to see how things actually turned out. Moreover, tort law
acts serially; as Peter Schuck has observed, it possesses a low degree
of "corrigibility." A risk-balancing decision may pass muster with a
dozen different courts, until the defendant's luck runs out somewhere
in West Virginia. For both tort and corporate law, each day is a new
one.
These fundamental differences underscore why tort law has sought
to make successor liability law more tort-like, by considering factors
such as fairness and risk-spreading'0 even as it has been criticized for
being insufficiently respectful of the corporate form. Corporate law's
occasional acquiescences are frequently ill-suited to meet the needs of
the tort system. For example, the "fraudulent conveyance" exception
99. And just as tort law wishes corporate law would be more like tort, corporate law's perva-
sive efficiency concerns, while empirically unverifiable, are frustrated by the messy processes of
tort. I believe this is why tort problems receive so little conscientious attention from corporate
law scholars. At bottom, coordinating between a tidy corporate law and its structural antithesis
may seem a trivial use of time. Surely, most corporate law enthusiasts appear to feel, this prob-
lem would simply go away if people would self-insure for their injuries, thus eliminating the
necessity of the tort system. A number of tort scholars would agree-though for different rea-
sons. But the social meaning of tort law is not efficiency alone.
100. See generally Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 U. Iu. L. RiEv.
845.
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to successor non-liability is largely a dead letter from the torts per-
spective. It will be the rare tort creditor who arrives at corporate
headquarters with a judgment on which the ink has not yet dried, only
to find it "under new management."10 It is expensive to evade margi-
nal tort liabilities, and relatively few claims are sufficient to render a
firm insolvent. If a firm is badly run and has accrued contingent (and
unknown) tort claims prior to the transfer of assets elsewhere, the
plaintiff's problem is not that he has been defrauded. His problem is
that he was harmed by a poorly run company that subsequently went
out of business.
Tort law rarely stands still when the blood of innocents is spilled.
This led the tort system towards assets to which it could pin some kind
of animating personality (in this case, wrongdoing). But, having de-
fined "wrongdoing" down, on paper at least, this move was vulnerable
to instrumentalist critiques. One such critique took the form of deci-
sions denying successor liability on the ground that the goals of strict
liability would not thereby be served. If strict liability was necessary
to internalize accident costs in the producer, that goal was thwarted by
the fact that the producer was no longer in existence.' 0 2 Accordingly,
the costs could not be distributed to the product's consumers.'0 3
This suggestion recalls the DES problem sketched above. The prac-
tical-as opposed to theoretical-constraints on targeted risk spread-
ing are real, but they are often just as real absent a corporate
reorganization. They are implicated by any long-tailed claim.104 De-
nying liability on this ground, however, overlooks what Michael
Green has labeled the "channel[ing] function" of successor liability. 05
By imposing liability on the successor, would-be predecessors know
that they will be unable to rinse the stain of their tortious conduct
from assets they may transfer in the future.' 0 6 This is consistent (al-
101. Id. at 888 ("The fraud exception may be ripe for use to expand plaintiffs' recovery. How-
ever, thus far efforts by plaintiffs to utilize the fraud exception have been rare, and successful use
of the exception has been rarer yet. One reason may be that the intent element for fraud is
perceived as difficult to prove in the context of corporate asset acquisitions.").
102. See Alfred R. Light, "Product Line" and "Continuity of Enterprise" Theories of Corpo-
rate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 11 Miss. COLL. L. REV. 63, 74-75 & n.74 (1990) (col-
lecting cases rejecting successor liability on the grounds that the successor neither created the
risk nor profited from it).
103. Cf Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 1986) (suggesting limitations on
§ 402A's risk-spreading rationale while considering the proper scope of successor liability).
104. The Polius court, while rejecting successor liability, thoughtfully observed that the ques-
tion could be recharacterized as one of determining an appropriate statute of repose. See id.
105. Green, supra note 88, at 913-18.
106. See Cupp, supra note 100, at 860-61.
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beit in a second-best way) with both the deterrence and risk-spreading
rationales.
Successor liability is a problematic doctrine. From the torts per-
spective, its contours are often ill-fitted to the needs of tort claimants.
From the corporate law perspective, its occasionally tort-flavored
character and application threaten to undo expectations that may
have been created in good faith. This "sporadically flexible" 07 doc-
trine is a partial and uncertain abrogation of one of the central charac-
teristics of corporate law: limited liability. This Article cannot resolve
the disagreement between corporate and tort law (and scholars). In-
stead, it simply observes that the tort system would have to invent
something like successor liability (and veil-piercing) if those concepts
did not already exist.108 It is no accident that the most contested as-
pects of these doctrines reflect norms (like fairness), activities (manu-
facturing defective products), and a mode of decision (fact-specific,
highly contextualized) that are familiar to tort law. At the risk of un-
due (and possibly trans-species) anthropomorphizing, it is unrealistic
for corporate law to expect tort law to simply roll over and play dead.
However, one must admit that unlimited justice in the uneven light of
the tort system is not the only result that right-thinking people could
possibly devise.
107. See Schuhalter, supra note 78, at 831.
108. Indeed, other tort doctrines similarly tiptoe over the border with corporate law. A signif-
icant body of case law recognizes that one who acquires a business via succession or asset sale
may be liable for failing to provide a post-sale warning regarding the risks of a predecessor's
products. This view has been carried forward without objection in RESrAuEMENT (TinRD) oF
Towrs: PRoiUers LIAnnrry § 13 (1998). This is surprising given the Restatement's skepticism
of asset-based successor liability expressed in Section 12, governing successor liability generally
(and rejecting the product-line exception). If a putative successor truly has nothing to do with a
product risk, which rejecting courts frequently suggest, then it is as much a stranger to the risk
when it is simply expressed a slightly different way, as in post-sale duties. Cf Elmer v. Tenneco
Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535, 543 (D. Del. 1988) (declining to treat a successor's post-acquisition
failure to warn differently from successor liability for pre-acquisition lapses).
Another incursion is the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine, by which A is held liable for prod-
uct defects to the same extent as actual manufacturer B, when the product is "held out" to the
public as A's. In a number of cases in which firms have used subsidiaries and trademark licens-
ing agreements to market products while evading liability for their defects, courts have used the
doctrine to attribute liability, in effect, piercing the corporate veil without saying so explicitly.
See, e.g., Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 901 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1990); McCloud v.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am., Ltd., No. 04-1118, 2006 WL 3627654 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2006).
This doctrine is also carried forward in Section 14 of the Products Restatement. Although liabil-
ity for licensors is restricted to those who substantially participate in the marketing or design or
distribution of a product, creative liability-channeling organizations are neither inexpensive nor
easy to implement without the combined competencies of the organization as a whole. See Roe,
supra note 66, at 36-37.
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X. TOWARDS COMPLEMENTARITY
A. Corporate Form and Responsibility
To explore how the distinctive competences of these two systems
might yet be mediated by a third, a useful point of departure is sup-
plied by David Millon. Millon recently explored the issue of veil-
piercing, and concluded that neither absolute limited liability nor the
particular contours of veil-piercing doctrine were defensible. 109
Reconceptualizing the issue as a policy decision to ensure financial
responsibility, he suggests "[t]ailoring limited liability so as to create a
de facto reasonable insurance requirement."' 10 Similarly, Michael
Green has suggested dealing with the basic problem of successor lia-
bility with a legislatively imposed requirement for the successor to ob-
tain insurance coverage.'
Millon recognizes that determining the meaning of such a require-
ment ex post (and I presume, ex ante) might be difficult. He suggests
the problem may be more theoretical than practical.112 I am not so
sure. A reasonable insurance requirement would presumably disre-
gard the rational limits on insurance purchases implied by limited
shareholder liability. That is, shareholders would ordinarily be un-
likely to demand insurance in excess of their maximum potential
loss-the value of their shares. Such a requirement can be described,
with a nod to Professor Keeton,' 3 as a requirement to purchase insur-
ance without regard to the "limits" of shareholder exposure. For
small firms, this will work a substantial change. A taxi company-not
just the rather clever sort Millon describes in his articlel 14-with a
$100,000 investment would rationally insure to some amount below
109. See generally Millon, supra note 73, at 1305.
110. Id. at 1376.
111. See Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect
Products Liability Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 17 (1986). Legislatures, perhaps responding
rationally to the collective action advantages enjoyed by manufacturing firms and insurers
(rather than contingent tort claimants) have not demonstrated their superiority to common law
by rising to Green's suggestions. See Cupp & Frost, supra note 91, at 1193 (observing absence of
legislative action despite thirty years of commentary, and attributing this in part to a "race to the
bottom" in which states have few incentives to make their liability laws less hospitable to
industry).
112. Millon, supra note 73, at 1375.
113. See Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L.
Riv. 1136, 1147-48 (1953) (developing the concept of the "reasonably prudent insurer" obli-
gated to evaluate settlement offers without regard to policy limits, but rather the expected value
of the case).
114. The lowly hack has long been a staple of veil-piercing discussion. See Bainbridge, supra
note 15, at 5 (reciting the "classic case" of Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966)).
Walkovsky involved a pedestrian hit by a taxi operated by one of ten firms controlled by a single
shareholder, each carrying minimum liability insurance. Id.
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that. Applying the Millon-Keeton rule, the company may be required
to purchase some multiple of this amount to account for maximum
potential taxi casualties. 1 5 There is no obviously correct answer to
this problem. Industry practice-governed by the enfeebled and va-
ried requirements of state financial responsibility laws-is likely one
of severe underinsurance. 116
The problem could be attacked empirically, but there are limita-
tions there, too. Accident claim compensation is almost invariably
governed by liability insurance limits. Although tort liability is not
formally bound to such limits, the difficulties of collecting assets from
the defendant apart from the insurance mean that, as a practical mat-
ter, insurance policy limits are the tort reform that counts.117 Thus,
even if one decided to require insurance for taxi drivers at the level
implied by the average taxicab injury settlement, that figure already
entails the private decision of the company to forego higher limits.
One could borrow from tort reform statutes which reflect legislative
judgments about reasonable compensation; such limits, despite their
flaws, would capture a substantial percentage of liability events. And
perhaps that is the best that can be said for numerical limits on
tort compensation: judgments in excess of the typical cap
($250,000-$500,000 is a common range)r 8 ought to occur relatively
rarely. A reasonable insurance requirement that captures all but in-
frequent events sounds workable but requires further study.
Perhaps Professors Millon, Green, and I can undertake such a study
in the future. For now, it is enough to ask what this idea might mean
for successor liability and extant insurance coverage. An aspect of
successor liability that is troublesome from the perspectives of both
corporate law and torts is the potential for horizontal inequality. Con-
sider the following example: Corporations ABC and XYZ produce
nearly identical widgets, equally defective in design. ABC's poor
management consigns it to bankruptcy, where future tort creditors are
115. This approach would govern equally well the arrangements required of firms with high
market capitalizations. Even in these asset-depressed times, publicly traded firms often have
valuations far in excess of any available liability limits. A "reasonable" insurance requirement
looks only to the scope of foreseeable risks, not the firm's actual value. True, that value may be
accessible given sufficient motivation, but a partial abrogation of limited liability will eliminate
that motivation in all but the most extraordinary cases.
116. Ohio, for example, requires motorists to carry $12,500 of liability insurance per injury
claimant (up to two). Oino REV. CoiE ANN. § 4509.51(B) (LexisNexis 1995).
117. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability In-
surance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2005).
118. See generally Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (Northwestern Law
& Econ. Research Paper No. 06-08, 2010).
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likely to receive nothing.119 XYZ fares somewhat better and is ac-
quired by a highly solvent firm. Unwisely, the "angel" firm merges
directly with XYZ, or takes its assets in a manner susceptible to the
"sporadically flexible" power of successor liability.
A plaintiff suing ABC will be frustrated; a plaintiff suing New XYZ
will receive full value for his claim. It is odd that effective liability
turns not on the fortunes of enterprise-which seems an issue some-
what beyond the reach of private law-but on the law itself.120 Could
insurance be the answer?
B. Liability Insurance and Liability: The Complementarity Norm
Insurance would seem to be the ideal mediator between the de-
mands of the corporate form and the tort system. Among many other
things, insurance is the means by which the promises of the past are
given substance and translated across time to the present. Unfortu-
nately, courts have at times treated insurance as a kind of all-purpose
tool capable of dealing with whatever tort problem that needs solv-
ing.121 In addition to the implicit reliance on insurance as a mecha-
nism for risk spreading, courts have explicitly treated the actual or
presumed availability of liability insurance as a factor in deciding par-
ticular categories of liability.122
119. Whether a bankruptcy sale would "rinse" a defective product line of potential successor
liability is unclear. See, e.g., William Hao, The Effects of Bankruptcy Discharge and Sale on
Successor Liability, 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 431 (2008); Steve Jakubowski, What's
Bothering Ruthie? Chrysler Bankruptcy Sale Opinion Analysis-Part II, BANKR. LIT. BLOG (June
9, 2009), http://www.bankruptcylitigationblog.com/archives/bankruptcy-in-the-news-whats-both-
ering-ruthie-chrysler-bankruptcy-sale-opinion-analysis-part-ii.html.
120. Limiting successor liability to the pre-acquisition value of the predecessor (the acquired
firm) would avoid this concern. However, tort judgments are not formally coordinated; there is
no central clearinghouse that might keep a running total of succession claims, cutting them off
(somehow) when the pre-acquisition value is reached. PRODuCrs RESTATEMENT, supra note
108, at 210-11. The reporters suggest, following Green, the purchase of a "bond or other secur-
ity" at the time of transaction could ameliorate this concern (as well as the concern under pre-
sent law that some plaintiffs will receive windfalls, and some transactions be unfairly penalized,
due to the particular form the acquisition takes. Id. at 217. This sounds a lot like liability insur-
ance. While such a view is consistent with this Article, the focus here is on existing coverage,
rather than coverage originating with an acquisition.
121. An outstanding exploration of this point that should give even the most determined com-
plementarians pause is found in John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Efficiency
of Tort Law, 85 Micii. L. REV. 1820 (1985).
122. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) ("Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility
be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defec-
tive products that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury
from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the
loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless
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It turns out that this treatment reveals why insurance law is
uniquely positioned to deal with some aspects of successor liability.
Like products liability, the exact nature of insurance law is often a
matter of highly successful obfuscation. 123 Its origins lie in contract,
and it still takes the form of contract law, but it was one of the first
categories of contract to drown in a sea of tort.124 Not only is insur-
ance law highly susceptible to recharacterization in tort, but in the
liability context, the insurance promise has taken on the coloration of
the tort system.
Ken Abraham has described some of the ways in which insurance
and tort law have come to rely on one another. 125 He offers several
examples of what may be called descriptive complementarity; the
shape of a particular tort liability has historically been influenced by
expectations about the nature of the insurance system; in turn, insur-
ance law is subtly bent around the outline of liability.126 I would like
to extend this idea to make the case for normative complementarity:
insurance contracts should be construed so as to harmonize with the
underlying liabilities to which they relate. The reach of such a princi-
ple is not obvious, so let me explain what it does and does not mean.
It does not mean that coverage should attach to liability without
regard for the essential functions of insurance contracts. Those con-
tracts determine basic questions of eligibility (for example, premium-
paying policyholders); the broad outlines of covered events (property
damage or bodily injury), methods for allocating losses temporally
(for example, claims-made versus occurrence-based coverage) and
among relevant parties (other insurers and self-insurance mecha-
nisms); and exclusions that either segment insurance markets or re-
solve lingering questions of scope.
one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public
as a cost of doing business."); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1225 n.9 (N.J. 1984) ("But the
critical issue here is not whether the homeowner can pass the cost on or must bear it himself, but
whether tort law should be used to spread the risk over a large segment of society through the
device of insurance rather than imposing the entire risk on the innocent victim of drunken
driving.").
123. Compare Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORiE L. RE~v.
203 (2010), with Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 Towr TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 813 (2009).
124. See I JEFFREY W. STEMPF L, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 3.01 (3d ed. 2011)
(noting the decline of classical contract theory in favor of "equitable, case specific, and subjec-
tive interpretation and even the utilization of tort-related concepts").
125. See generally KENNEII S. ABRAHAM, TiHE LIABILITY CENTURY (2008).
126. See Adam F. Scales, The Chicken and the Egg: Kenneth S. Abraham's "The Liability
Century," 94 VA. L. Ri~v. 1259, 1275 n.46 (2008).
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But normative complementarity does provide guidance for deter-
mining the extent of ambiguity and the reasonableness of what are
typically post facto expectations of policyholders. Complementarity
also suggests when judges should abandon the pretense of finding am-
biguity and acknowledge the deft use of a blue pencil to shape an
insurance contract around the materialization of the risk for which it
was structured. Actual tort liabilities, rather than hyper-fine herme-
neutics or judges' entirely unempirical suppositions regarding the ex-
pectations of consumers, 12 7 ought to define the scope of insurance
rights where those rights are inadequately specified in a transaction.
And those liabilities may trump even well-specified allocations that
unjustifiably frustrate the effective functioning of the liability system.
In essence, complementarity requires liability coverage to be
molded with reference to the underlying tort liability to which it re-
fers. Subject to the considerable constraints of factors such as market
segmentation, policyholder choice regarding the extent of coverage,
and insurers' desire to lessen moral hazard, liability coverage should
be coordinated with liability. Complementarity may be the answer to
the long-simmering problem of defining the appropriate reach of ex-
clusionary provisions in insurance contracts; in the realms of accident
insurance, property damage, and liability coverage, insurers have
slowly carved out the marrow of protection in ways that serve no pur-
pose other than insurers' general desire to pay less.128
Complementarity as an interpretive and regulatory ideal rests on
two principal arguments, one of which can be extended to deal with
successor liabilities. Although mediated by contract, liability insur-
ance law is a creature of the tort system-the other half, in Abraham's
perfect phrasing, of "a binary star." 129 Because ours is indeed a
largely judgment-proof society, 130 effective liability is generally gov-
erned by the available insurance coverage.
Courts have varied in the candor with which they acknowledge this
fact. And they have, as I suggest above, at times treated insurance
127. They may not remain unempirical for long. See Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt &
Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 Coi.uM. L. RFV. 1268
(2008) (reporting results of survey research examining respondents' perceptions of ambiguity in
insurance contracts).
128. In previous work, I have identified this pattern with respect to exclusions from first-party
accident policies, and the anti-concurrent causation feature of modern home insurance. In a
future article, I will examine insurers' efforts to limit coverage for emotional distress, even as
such damages have become increasingly conventional within tort law.
129. ABRAHAM, supra note 125, at 1.
130. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LE- L. REv. 603 (2006)
(detailing substantial statutory, common law, and practical barriers to the direct enforceability of
tort judgments).
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like a magic ointment that could be rubbed into the wounds of an
innocent, seemingly deserving plaintiff. Despite occasional ex-
cesses,131 it is right (and honest) that courts recognize tort plaintiffs as
stakeholders in what appears on the surface to be a dispute between
parties who have contracted over insurance. After all, when effective
liabilities are dramatically scaled upwards-whether by judicial vari-
ance of coverage limitations or imposition of bad faith liability-these
liabilities rarely redound directly to the benefit of the policyholder. If
the policyholder is an individual, his insolvency (or judgment-immu-
nity) was ensured the moment the tort was completed; if the policy-
holder is a corporation, a substantial tort judgment may obscure the
benefit of enhanced insurance coverage precisely because shareholder
liability is limited. (The most "creative" interpretations of insurance
contracts, as well as the typical bad faith judgment, rarely embrace
large and sophisticated policyholders.)
Although it is abstractly inelegant that some plaintiffs (those fortu-
nate enough to be injured by policyholders with ambiguous contracts
issued by unconscionable insurers) will recover more than others, this
is little different from the inequality that arises from the fact that
some defendants have insurance and others do not.132 Tort liability
alone is an insufficient basis for creating liability coverage-and this,
in fact, rarely happens; but it is an appropriate mold for shaping cov-
erage. To do so is simply to vindicate the interests of the party whom
all understand is the true beneficiary of the insurance contract: the
tort victim.
A second, broader rationale also looks to the contours of the tort
system. The insurance promise has value precisely because it is meant
to endure the periodic expansion of tort liability and the occasionally
unpredictable character of its imposition.
Insurers' institutional knowledge of liability insurers lies at the
heart of that promise. For all but the most sophisticated policyhold-
131. See, e.g., Rusthoven v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 642 644-45 (Minn.
1986) (creatively seizing upon ambiguity in an uninsured motorist policy to find that the policy-
holder reasonably expected coverage sixty-seven times greater than the coverage for which it
paid).
132. This otherwise uninteresting observation captures a larger truth explored in this Article:
discrete disciplines within the legal system cannot solve every problem that is comprehensible as
a problem within the norms of each discipline. Tort law cannot run roughshod over every princi-
ple of corporate or insurance jurisprudence in the name of fulfilling its remit to right wrongs.
Nor can corporate law-in an enlightened system of law-assert itself without regard to the aims
of its fellow systems. Insurance law's contract origins must not obscure the immense, pan-juris-
prudential functions that have been located in the insuring enterprise. These normative claims,
which may also be classed under the rubric of "complementarity," are supported by the observa-
tion that the legal system has never treated these bodies of law completely discretely.
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ers, liability insurance is more than an unusually structured savings
account. The insurer promises and the policyholder relies on its ex-
pertise in tort litigation. 33 Expertise is more than the ability to sum-
marize the basic rules of tort liability and defense. After all, many
policyholders will abstractly understand that they ought to conform
themselves to the requirements of reasonable care. Liability insurance
is valuable because insurers are uniquely positioned to aggregate and
sift through liability data, which is merely the definition of underwrit-
ing, and identify emergent patterns of claiming. As they stand astride
both claims departments generating raw data and tort law courts syn-
thesizing bits of that data into liability rules, insurers are well-suited to
comprehend and distribute tort system uncertainty. This is the uncer-
tainty that surrounds the timing and contours of emergent liabilities.
Put another way, insurance manages the risk of changes in the identity
of tort claims.
Insurers can respond in several ways to these new patterns. Most
optimistically, they can guide policyholder conduct in ways that mini-
mize losses. From a societal standpoint, this is preferable to insurers'
occasionally preferred method of reducing their losses via policy ex-
clusions for newer types of claims without regard to any characteris-
tics that would imply that well-informed parties to the insurance
contract would bargain for exclusion.
When prevention fails, distribution of losses is of course the classic
mechanism for ameliorating the effects. Here, the focus is on the dis-
tribution of those losses across time and among "generations" of poli-
cyholders (or, in some cases, among temporal iterations of the same
policyholder). Implicit in the normative complementarity ideal is the
likelihood that claiming patterns will be imperfectly anticipated at the
time the insurance bargain is struck. Of course, this can work in both
directions. A purchaser of an occurrence-based policy in 1960 would
have likely underpaid relative to the emerging liabilities of the years
ahead.134 However, in 1985, a similar purchaser would not only be
buying at the top of an insurance market hardened significantly by
those new liabilities but would ultimately "receive" less indemnity-in
2010, for example-as those liabilities receded along with the tort sys-
tem that began about that time to fall out of favor. The value of the
133. Cf Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1160-62 (1990) (describing
complex settlement implications of insurers' status as "repeat players" in the liability system).
134. Even Jeffrey Stempel grudgingly acknowledges that "[tjhe magnitude and longevity of
the asbestos problem undoubtedly caught the insurance industry by surprise." Stempel, supra
note 37, at 352-53. Stempel maintains, however, that the marketing and structure of liability
policies fairly attribute the risks of such developments to insurance companies. Id. And Stempel
will be no doubt surprised to learn that I grudgingly agree.
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insurance promise is thus shaped over time by the currents of liability
law. If this sounds familiar, it should; it is an insurance-side variation
on the DES problem described earlier.
Complementarity supplies a rationale for holding insurers accounta-
ble for the promises of the past despite the interesting metaphysics of
corporate reorganizations. Instantiating this principle will require co-
ordination among insurance, tort, and corporate law. But it is a prin-
ciple that serves equitably the divergent norms of these systems. And
insurance is comfortably situated at their intersection. Theseus' ship
may evolve one plank at a time until it is wholly new; insurance is the
promise that binds the planks together.
C. Shifting Masks, Stable Risks
Insurers argue (and some courts have agreed) that extending cover-
age to corporate successors ties the insurer to a bargain it never made
and to a party with whom it has never dealt.135 Yet this argument
elevates the corporate fiction of separate personality beyond reality.
Successor liability attempts, often indirectly, to understand whether
the entity is properly identified with the wrongdoer. Liability insur-
ance contracts depend vitally on the stability of that identity across
time; that is, the risk imposed would diverge from the risk undertaken
if the identity of the policyholder changed. However, in many cases,
this is not the problem insurers suggest.
Consider an insured corporation whose shares are purchased out-
right by another. To lend specificity to this example, imagine Rupert
Murdoch (rather than Carlos Slim) was the billionaire who rescued
the New York Times from its dire straits.136 Gradually increasing his
holdings (strangely unnoticed by Fox News), Murdoch assumes com-
plete ownership of the New York Times Company (NYT). Is it the
same company? Yes, it is. The NYT's liability insurer remains an-
swerable for claims that arose under prior ownership. Indeed, it will
remain liable for claims arising during the remainder of the policy pe-
riod. The insurer could cancel or re-underwrite coverage. But this
would be prospective only.
New NYT is undoubtedly in a position, as a tort defendant, to influ-
ence the disposition of pre-acquisition claims, as surely as newly in-
stalled management of a forward-merged company is. But this is
irrelevant; the liability risks of pre-acquisition conduct are entirely un-
135. See, e.g., Foggan & Lavin, supra note 36, at 6, 10.
136. Eric Dash, New York Times Accepts an Investor's $250 Million Loan, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
20, 2009, at B1I.
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changed. The rights of the insurer to control settlement and direct the
defense remain an effective tool for disciplining a policyholder who
acts to exacerbate liabilities.
Thinking about the successor liability problem this way suggests
that insurers are not actually fearful of increased liabilities resulting
from corporate reorganization. If so, they would regularly protest any
substantial changes in corporate control. In fact, insurers have occa-
sionally sought to distance themselves from policyholders that for-
mally merged into successors. These efforts have been unsuccessful. 37
A merger or consolidation does not create new liabilities, nor does it
enhance existing ones. Tort liability is largely exogenous to post-oc-
currence changes in corporate ownership. To deny coverage entirely,
or perversely limit it to a party that is not going to be sued for the risk
insured, vindicates neither the expectations of the insurer nor those of
the parties to the merger. Instead, it merely permits the insurer to
reap the gains from writing premiums for risks that entirely unrelated
corporate transactions have providently directed away from the in-
surer's door.138 The question courts should ask is whether the rele-
vant expectations change dramatically when the "succession" is
informal. The answer is that they usually do not, but when they do,
the answer is to accommodate them, with each system doing what it
does best.
XI. HENKEL RECONSIDERED, SLIGHTLY
I wrote earlier that the Henkel problem was more complicated than
I originally realized. The Henkel approach is to elevate a standard
anti-assignment provision of insurance contracts over the interests of
transacting parties and the tort system. Anti-assignment is in no way a
bargained-for provision in the context of corporate succession, if ever.
Let us assume that Justice Moreno was correct in his dissent, and that
there is no sound basis for enforcing assignment restrictions absent
practical (not theoretical) prejudice to the insurer. 139 Reading the fair
137. See Waldron & Stanton, supra note 36, 392-94.
138. Insurers' true concern is simply that they will be held responsible for the bargains they
struck long ago. Given the complications of successor liability doctrine, and the frequent effec-
tive prerequisite of insurance coverage, the true coverage windfall occurs where insurance rights
are not transferred along with their associated liabilities. Without transfer, the liability policy is a
dead letter, its longstanding promise fortuitously unopened for want of a current address.
139. Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 79-80 (Cal. 2003)
(Moreno, J., dissenting). The Henkel majority's position rests on a controversial idea, and its
immediate contradiction. Henkel determined that assignability of insurance policy rights turns on
whether the rights have been fixed-"reduced to a sum of money due or to become due." Id. at
77 (majority opinion). Only then, the majority concluded, is the right a "chose in action" that
may be transferred. As Justice Moreno pointed out, a chose in action need not be so "fixed" at
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number of pre-Henkel decisions analyzing coverage issues in the
shadow, one is struck by the pattern of incomplete specification of
insurance rights.140
XII. CATEGORIES OF TRANSFER INTENTIONS
One would think the specification of insurance asset transfers would
be crystal clear. And they certainly would, if torts and insurance
professors rather than skilled corporate lawyers drafted them. There
are four possible variations on this theme: (1) the policy is transferred
with the consent of the insurer; (2) the parties intend the policy to
transfer, and believe a transfer of "all assets and liabilities" does so;
(3) the parties are content to let sleeping dogs lie undisturbed, for
now; and (4) the purported transferor intends to retain the coverage.
The only possibility that may be safely eliminated is Category 1.
There is little evidence that insurers are willing to extend coverage
that effectively revives long-tailed liability claims for consideration
that successors would actually be willing to pay. A long-tailed event is
insurable, even if losses seem certain. However, it is no longer insura-
all. Id. at 76-79 (Moreno, J., dissenting). Most assignments involve losses that are fixed rather
than legal determinations of those losses. Of course, California can define chose in action as it
likes. But this definition runs smack into an exception the Henkel court itself embraced: that
policy rights are assignable when the insurer has breached a duty to the policyholder (and thus,
the policyholder holds a claim for that breach that it wishes to assign, usually a tort claimant).
This is a perfectly sensible restraint on non-alienation. It is a longstanding rule in California
(which originated much of modern bad faith law, a law that effectively required policy assign-
ments, despite anti-assignment clauses). It has the virtue of embracing, tacitly, the complemen-
tarity principle, as it recognizes the interplay between tort and liability law.
The only problem is that recognizing this exception completely eviscerates the "principle"
underlying the newly announced rule. Bad faith assignments invariably take place after loss, but
before a claim has been reduced to a money judgment. When an insurer has abandoned its
liability policyholder, the insurance policy rights (including damages for breach) are often the
one "asset" the policyholder has to turn over to the tort claimant. Even if that transfer follows a
judgment of the policyholder's liability, it will not precede determination of the insurer's liability
to the policyholder for its breach. Moreover, the Henkel articulation of this exception would
appear to embrace a successor who takes assignment from a predecessor abandoned by its in-
surer-for now the inchoate claim would qualify as a "real" chose in action.
140. See Joseph W. Hovermill & Angela N. Whittaker, Without Consent: Establishing a Cor-
porate Successor's Rights to the Predecessor's Insurance Coverage, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 105
(2001). The authors note the "incomplete or completely absent [insurance] documentation" that
often attends "incomplete or completely absent transaction documentation." Id. at 105. Trans-
actions-which themselves may predate the emergence of long-tailed liabilities-often include
vague and contradictory provisions relating to insurance. For example, one reported transaction
provided that the transferee was to receive "'all of the [predecessor's] assets,' including, 'all
contracts ... insurance policies ... and other binding contracts."' Id. at 116-17 (alterations in
original) (quoting N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir.
1992)). This seems clear enough as a statement of intent. Unfortunately, a separate provision
excluded any contract assets that required consent for assignment. The vast majority of insur-
ance contracts do.
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ble at the price available before losses were known (and the tort sys-
tem stood ready to redeem them). A retrospective premium could be
determined, but apart from the timing and ultimate size of the loss,
there is no longer a "risk" to speak of. That is, the premium price
would equal the cost of liabilities incurred but not reported, and that
is unlikely to be a price anyone is willing to pay.1 4 1
Moreover, selling someone a product which has already been paid
for is at best a challenging proposition. The transacting parties may
hope that the policy will transfer but are reluctant to secure a formal
agreement from the insurer, lest the price be confiscatory (as it surely
would, for firms with a recognized, if contingent tort exposure). I
have found no instances in which parties have sought and an insurer
has agreed to assignment of a policy in the face of a large impending
exposure. 142 Again, the price of assignment is unlikely to be a modest
administrative fee, but instead a retrospectively underwritten pre-
mium. 1 4 3 In Henkel, for example, the liability picture at the time of
transaction in the late 1970s was a lot different than it had been during
the early years of Amchem's operations. Indeed, this changed picture
was likely one of the reasons for the transaction itself.
Regarding Category 2, if the transacting parties contemplate the
transfer of insurance, then treating insurance coverage as an inaliena-
ble asset tied to a particular organizational form frustrates those ex-
pectations. As Tom Baker has argued, such a rule will channel
transacting parties towards organizational forms that may be less effi-
cient for tax or business reasons simply to accommodate the objec-
tions of insurers.144 Formal mergers and other transfers of corporate
control implicate the exact same concerns as less direct examples of
succession. But formal mergers avoid the reach of anti-assignment
language because the successor is the predecessor. There is little to
justify this elevation of form over substance: the only "detriment" to
the insurer is that it must actually perform its obligations; transacting
141. This has been described as a "claims-made insurance premium on top of [an] occurrence
premium." Baker et al., supra note 37, at 9.
142. Of course, such transactions would be unlikely to generate disputes.
143. Also known as an "M&A Premium." Id. at 11. Unusual insurance arrangements are
available, such as "loss mitigation insurance," which can be tailored to fit within or replace ex-
isting insurance policies that a succession might reveal to be inadequate. See Tobias Insurance
Group, Inc., Understanding the Role of Loss Mitigation Insurance, 1 RISK MONITOR 1, available
at http://www.tobias.com/NEWSLETTERS/04JulyRM.pdf. A favorite is the impishly named
"sleep easy" policy suggested as a transaction planning tool by Howard Schechter in the 1980s.
See Schechter, supra note 18, at 149. In a vivid illustration of tort law's capacity for unearthing
implausible connections, Mr. Schechter's daughter Julie dramatically portrayed the sufferings of
Helen Palsgraf as a student in my torts class many years later.
144. Baker, supra note 117, at 21-23.
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parties (and presumably society as a whole) would be deprived of the
benefits of efficient organizational structures. And tort claimants will
in some circumstances be deprived of the most practical avenue of
recovery for valid claims.
Applying the complementarity principle is consistent with the im-
plicit recognition that the law is skeptical of claims that corporate
identity, and all of its incidents, are mutable without restriction. Cor-
porate law confirms this via de facto merger doctrine. Tort law rein-
forces this with successor liability rules, some resembling de facto
merger doctrine and others reflecting tort's special interest in impos-
ing liability on wrongdoers and "wrong" products. Even insurance
law recognizes this with its careful non-application of assignment pro-
visions to formally merged (yet operationally distinct) firms. This rec-
ognition requires liability insurers to provide coverage for corporate
wrongdoing that they have insured, notwithstanding post-wrongdoing
changes in the corporate form. In this sense, coverage should follow
liability by operation of law.
Category 4 signals that transferors of corporate assets may not be
indifferent to the disposition of insurance assets. Insurance coverage
is tied to firms, not directly to their activities. This tracks tort law
(liability is usually imposed on persons, not their assets),'145 but the
incomplete complementarity between tort and corporate law compli-
cates the picture.
Consider a firm (creatively named "Firm") that engages in three
activities. Firm manufactures children's toys consisting of colorful
bags of broken glass. Second, it sells a profitable line of insulating
products containing a recently discovered miracle fiber, dysbestos. Fi-
nally, incident to these marketing activities, Firm's factories produce
large amounts of waste that it stores in vast, porous holding ponds.
The firm is insured by Acme Casualty Company (Acme), which gen-
erously indemnifies for "all liabilities arising from Your business."
145. Recall the trucking firm warehouse example. Inanimate objects can appear to possess
(or at least define) liability under the law (such as maritime, or in rem proceedings), but this is
the exception. Prior to a successful tort claim, no plaintiff could prevail against a warehouse or
even isolate a defendant's warehouse as having especial significance for his claim. Corporate law
does not permit the segregation of assets according to their relevance to tort actions (nor, it
should be said, does remedies law). The tension between corporate law and tort can be thought
of as a question of priority: tort claims against a corporation do not ordinarily create priorities in
favor of the claimant for ownership of tort-relevant assets. Successor liability reflects an awk-
ward effort to place tort claimants in a position similar to what they would have enjoyed absent
succession, and in the products-liability context, this explains why successor liability is unusually
tied to tort-relevant assets. It thus resembles a tort-flavored form of equitable subordination.
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Firm's risk managers conclude that dysbestos poses a long-term lia-
bility risk and decide to exit the business. The managers believe that
the broken glass business is strong, and liabilities are reasonably well-
controlled by the newly revitalized doctrine of assumption of risk.
They are unaware of the environmental issues. The firm decides to
decouple its fate from that of dysbestos by creating a subsidiary, Dys-
bestos, Inc., and transferring to it "all dysbestos-related assets and lia-
bilities." That subsidiary is then merged with a separate firm, FoolCo.
FoolCo subsequently asks Acme to indemnify and defend it for occur-
rences during the period Acme insured the original Firm.
There are several interesting things here. It is easy to assume that
transacting parties will bargain over the allocation of tort liability.
That assumption is unrealistic in several categories of transactions. It
is unrealistic here with respect to the creation of the subsidiary. Like
the Henkel case, this is not an arm's-length transaction. Accepting
liability was an offer the whole-cloth subsidiary in Henkel could not
refuse. It is thus unlikely that Amchem No. 2 paid a claim-discounted
price for Amchem's chemicals business. After all, the one provision
that might be safely expected if such bargaining were actually occur-
ring would be a clear specification of the liability insurance policy
rights. That did not happen in Henkel.
The second transfer of the new subsidiary (into FoolCo) is an arm's
length transaction. But effective bargaining is clouded on two fronts.
First, these examples assume that the transferor remains in business
and is effectively suable. However, many reorganizations involve the
dissolution of the predecessor. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, this is a
requirement for the imposition of successor liability. A dissolved cor-
poration can sometimes be revived, but it is generally impractical to
do because the assets have been distributed and it is too costly to track
down individual shareholders. 1 4 6 The upshot is that if dissolution is in
the plan, there is less reason for the transferor and the transferee to
discount the purchase price to account for contingent pre-acquisition
liabilities; the predecessor will be gone, and the successor will often
not be liable. In fact, non-liability is an excellent reason to structure a
transfer so as to ensure dissolution-a potentially strategic rather than
an efficient outcome.
146. Interestingly enough, neither dissolution nor bankruptcy of the corporate policyholder
relieve liability insurers of their responsibilities. See COMMERCIAL LIABILrry INSURANCE, supra
note 2, § 4. This standard CGL provision, required in many states, recognizes that "liability
insurance functions not only to protect insureds from the financial consequences of their negli-
gence but also to protect the victims of that negligence-those who have been injured and to
whom damages are owed." Id.
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This shades into the second cloud. Successor liability is pretty mud-
dled, much like its cousin, veil-piercing. Apart from the "promise"
exception to successor non-liability, 14 7 predicting exactly when the
successor retains enough of the identity of the predecessor to qualify
under the de facto merger or continuation of enterprise exceptions is
difficult. Even the tort-friendly "product line" exception is easier to
describe in theory than to apply in practice, and the contours of its
acceptance vary widely.148 And fraudulent conveyance law will often
be unavailing for long-tail tort claimants; the statistical likelihood that
there will be claims at some point in the future will not sustain a find-
ing of undercapitalization. Finally, there is no mechanism for making
such inquiries with respect to every non-bankruptcy dissolution and
transfer of assets.149 Thus, bargaining over the rights to existing poli-
cies associated with such liabilities may be difficult here.
However, my hypothetical and Henkel involve firms that remain in
existence.150 And those firms need insurance coverage. Amchem
could have been sued not only for torts arising from the chemicals
business it had divested but also those arising from its other opera-
tions. The hypothetical firm above can expect to be a defendant in
cases arising from its broken glass operations. And, unknown for
147. The "promise" exception to successor nonliability is problematic for another reason. Po-
tential tort creditors may indeed have expectations about firms' financial responsibility. A pur-
chaser of a GM automobile expects that his warranty (including those that describe personal
injury claims) will be honored years later and until recently would not have considered the possi-
bility of insolvency. However, consumer expectations are rarely tied to specific reorganizations,
most of which occur without tort creditors having any awareness of them whatsoever. This is
particularly true for long-tailed products-liability claims involving third parties to the underlying
sale (as with DES claims). Although the fact that a transferee has voluntarily accepted liability
is interesting, it is not a rationale that has much to do with a wrongdoing-recourse rationale for
tort liability. Like de facto merger, it is a doctrine that fits more easily into a framework for
dealing with contract creditors, who may forbear intervention into a liability-extinguishing reor-
ganization in exchange for a "personal" guarantee-that of the transferee.
148. See, e.g., Cupp & Frost, supra note 91, at 1188 (noting "confusion about trend directions"
in successor liability law); George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability,
Bus. L. Riv. 9, 13 (2007) (noting a variety of approaches and suggesting "misstatement" in the
Products Restatement).
149. A model for doing so is suggested in a recent student Note, Successor Liability, Mass
Tort and Mandatory-Litigation Class Actions, 118 HARv. L. Rev. 2357, 2367-74 (2005). This
idea has some appeal, but I cannot imagine how it could be implemented.
150. Although existing "predecessors" may be expected to point fingers at the inanimate op-
erations they have divested to their "successors," the predecessors remain liable as a matter of
tort law. In such cases-there will be many-insurers will not receive a windfall under the Hen-
kel approach (although the other complications remain). Whether the typical reorganization
leaves a suable predecessor in existence is an empirical question beyond this Article's scope. I
suspect that insurers have made their own determination: If that answer is "No," objection to
transfer is a convenient mode of post-claim underwriting. If the answer is "Yes," then the objec-
tion may reflect insurers' view that, while their liability may be unavoidable, succession is a
headache they don't need.
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now, it will be a defendant for its environmental harms. Recall that
occurrence-based coverage can be "activated" decades after the un-
derlying wrong took place. A transferor that remained in business-
any business-might very well wish to retain coverage while washing
its hands of the liabilities that the coverage would otherwise
comprehend.
In retrospect, this could explain why insurance asset dispositions are
often inadequately specified in corporate transactions, as in Category
3. The parties wish to avoid the unpleasant news that an insurer ref-
uses assignment, which would explicitly inject liability considerations
that might otherwise be ignored. The transferor is happy to ignore
this, in the hopes that it will retain coverage that may be needed for
other operations later. The transferee may ignore the issue because
the transferee's agents are interested primarily in a rent-generating
transaction and will be absent by the time the check arrives. And one
must not overlook the capacity of corporate actors for genuine opti-
mism, particularly with respect to contingent, long-tailed tort claims
which are characteristic of product and environmental liabilities.
This problem, like successor liability itself, can be thought of as one
of priorities: which liability-generating entities-and by extension,
which classes of tort claimants-are entitled to insurance assets fol-
lowing a reorganization, and in which order? Moreover, should the
transacting parties be permitted to vary that default order? My an-
swer is that the insurance should follow the liability, unless clearly
specified otherwise-with a catch.
XIII. DETERMINING INSURANCE PRIORITIES
A. Henkel: An Administratively Easy Case
In relatively straightforward transactions, there are a limited num-
ber of candidates for insurance priority. Recalling Professor's Mil-
lon's idea of a reasonable insurance provision, a court should construe
asset transfers that result in tort liability to include a share of available
insurance coverage. The amount of that share turns, rather simply, on
the order in which tort claims are presented. Insurance policies typi-
cally contain limits on the number of covered occurrences (roughly,
accidents) as well as an overall dollar limit. Successor liability insur-
ance doctrine should merely recreate the outcome to be expected
where a firm incurs liabilities for diverse operations without the com-
plication of succession. If the hypothetical firm above were sued for
dysbestos, broken glass, and environmental harms (assume coverage
does not vary by activity or claim type), then the available insurance
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could be exhausted by the plaintiffs who are fortunate to present and
resolve their claims the earliest.
Similarly, if FoolCo incurs mounting dysbestos claims, while Firm
incurs relatively modest broken glass claims, it is possible that
FoolCo's liability will exhaust the underlying insurance while broken
glass claims are still ripening. Naturally, there will be nothing left by
the time the EPA inquires into Firm's holding ponds. There is nothing
anomalous in this outcome, given the absence of an unlimited insur-
ance requirement for all actors. It is exactly what would occur without
the complication of succession.
Suppose Firm, consistent with its risk-management plan, wishes to
retain all the extant liability coverage. Although it appears that plain-
tiffs are at times willing to focus their fire on successors rather than
predecessors who remain liable ("assumption of liability" agreements
are misnamed where there is a suable predecessor; they are essentially
indemnification agreements), the Firm has doubts about FoolCo's via-
bility; it reasons that there is a non-trivial chance it may yet be respon-
sible for dysbestos liabilities. And of course, it is concerned about
non-dysbestos exposure.
Contrary to my initial view of Henkel, this is a legitimate strategy.
It would be a mistake to assume that parties to a corporate reorgani-
zation could never devise something superior to a default rule of
matching the original insurance to the liability. Perhaps in a soft mar-
ket, the successor could obtain "tail" coverage at an attractive price.
Or, the ceded operations may be so profitable that they can sustain
foreseeable patterns of tort claims without the use of insurance. And
the possibility of genuine bargaining cannot be ignored with respect to
arm's-length transactions.
Therefore, parties should be free to specify whether historic insur-
ance arrangements remain with the transferor or follow the liability to
the transferee, subject to a requirement that the transferor may retain
the insurance only if the transfer provides an economically equivalent
guarantee of financial responsibility.151 If that guarantee is later de-
termined not to have been economically equivalent at the time of the
transaction, then the default rule applies.152
151. A retrospectively rated liability "tail" would be ideal, but-AIG's unfortunate experi-
ence with credit-default swaps aside-one cannot exclude the possibility of more creative ar-
rangements. Their specification must await another day.
152. Realistically, it is often going to be difficult to assess the equivalence of creative risk
arrangements before it is too late-that is, before the "real" insurance arrangements are ex-
hausted by post-acquisition defense and payment of pre-acquisition claims. And just as it would
obviously be inequitable for an insurer to pay a second time on an exhausted policy, it would be
equally unfair for the transferor to pay if the exhaustion was inevitable. Insufficient transaction-
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The simplest approach is for successors to automatically be treated
as "additional insureds" with respect to pre-acquisition occurrences
only. 53 Where there are multiple insureds (the members of a house-
hold, for example, or commercial tenants designated as additional in-
sureds under a lessor's policy), the available insurance is exhausted on
a first-come, first-serve basis. The proposed restriction here to pre-
acquisition occurrences reflects the fact that most reported successor
insurance disputes involve historic coverages that remain available de-
cades later simply because they were written on an occurrence basis.
There is obviously no obligation on the part of the predecessor (or
insurer) to ensure coverage for post-acquisition occurrences. Deter-
mining the timing and number of occurrences is a fascinating branch
of insurance law, 15 4 and there is no reason to suppose that such dis-
putes among predecessors and successors will be any more or less
difficult.
In practice, alternatives other than the additional insured designa-
tion may be difficult for parties to arrange. I suspect that the easiest
course will be one of negotiation with the existing insurer that is now
bound firmly to the risk, planks notwithstanding. Liable under the
default rule specified above, the insurer may find it convenient to pro-
vide additional amounts of coverage for a reasonable premium, or
agree to allocate available coverage in ways the parties think ideal but
which this default rule declines to permit without the insurer's con-
sent. More than anything, this alternative may simply illuminate the
ways in which all parties may bargain in the shadow of a default rule
often fitted imperfectly to any given transaction.
B. Glidden Co.: An Administravely Difficult Case
In 2006, the Ohio Supreme Court considered a pair of cases involv-
ing successor insurance. One involved a relatively simple transaction,
quite similar to Henkel. The other is a potential nightmare for profes-
sors who purport to discern "underlying structures" across liability
and corporate law, comprehended within a few simple rules.
related insurance arrangements would not, in such a case, be a cause of harm to the successor (or
tort plaintiffs). The transferor may be released from liabilities in excess of its guarantee if it can
demonstrate actual exhaustion (for example, by the on-going environmental harms in the "Firm"
example above) was inevitable.
153. This approach would satisfy the default rule as well, and likewise ensure that insurance-
funded tort recoveries enjoy the same priority they would absent succession.
154. See, e.g., Mich. Chem. Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1984)
(involving livestock poisoned over a two-year period by a flame retardant mislabeled as animal
feed).
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In Pilkington North America, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty and Surety
Co., ss the Ohio Supreme Court took a step and a half away from
Henkel.1 5 6 In 1986, Pilkington Brothers acquired the assets and liabili-
ties of a glass-manufacturing business from Libbey-Owens-Ford, oper-
ating it as a subsidiary named LOF Glass, Inc., which was eventually
renamed Pilkington North America.157 Libbey remained in busi-
nesses unrelated to glass manufacturing.158 When Pilkington was
targeted for environmental liabilities arising from LOF's pre-merger
operations, it sought coverage from Libbey's insurers.159
The court first rejected Henkel's strained definition of "chose in ac-
tion," holding that it arose with the underlying occurrence itself, not
the realization of a certain claim.160 Second, it ruled that a liability
policy's indemnity rights were accordingly alienable, notwithstanding
anti-assignment language.161 However, the parties stipulated that the
transaction had not done so. Finally, the court held that where succes-
sor liability is imposed under the "promise" exception-that is, via
contract-insurance coverage does not automatically arise by opera-
tion of law. 162 Pilkington thus permits transacting parties to transfer
155. Pilkington N. Am., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 861 N.E.2d 121, 124 (Ohio 2006).
156. See id. at 125-27.
157. Id. at 124.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 125.
161. Id. at 129.
162. The "promise" exception has thus been employed counterintuitively by both Ohio and
California as a basis to deny insurance coverage to promising successors. See Henkel Corp. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 80 (Cal. 2003); Pilkington, 861 N.E.2d at 130.
Structurally, the argument respects the idea that the transacting parties have the right to define
the transfers between them: "[I]f the parties fail to explicitly describe their rights under an insur-
ance contract, they may have had their reasons . . . ." Pilkington, 861 N.E.2d at 131. Implicitly,
courts appear more sympathetic to transferees saddled with possibly unexpected liabilities by
operation of law (not contract); linking insurance coverage to that liability has an equitable ring
to it.
The problem with this argument is that it is not tailored to the underlying rationale for succes-
sor liability. That rationale, as I have suggested, is one of identity between the "predecessor,"
the "successor," and the true wrongdoer. This is obvious where successor liability is imposed by
de facto merger doctrine. Likewise, the idea is carried forward where there is a continuity of
enterprise, particularly regarding tort-relevant assets, as in the product-line exception. The
promise exception to successor insurance doctrine illogically treats the assumption of liability,
and the transfer of the assets with which that liability was created, as if these transactions were
merely coincidental. In fact, liability is assumed precisely because of the asset transfer.
One can imagine asset transfers where only liability is retained (as an illustration, Daimler's
spin off of Chrysler was structured in such a way that Daimler essentially paid Cerberus to take
Chrysler off its hands), but these are unusual. And a transfer of assets to X, coupled with an
assumption of liabilities by Y, would likely mark a fraudulent conveyance, unless Y is a liability
insurer providing retrospective coverage. At bottom, the courts that have employed the promise
exception to deny insurance coverage have taken a narrower view of what successor liability is
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some, but not all of the liability insurance rights that might be impli-
cated by contractually defined form of successor liability. This, at
least, is progress, as it confirms that transferors have the power, vis-A-
vis their insurers, to transfer some insurance rights to liability transfer-
ees. However, it does not account for the possibility, detailed earlier,
that the parties may bargain strategically to the detriment of tort
claimants, leaving a transferee without sufficient insurance assets to
match its inherited liabilities. Moreover, Pilkington rests on the view,
which will often be unrealistic, that the transacting parties are "bar-
gaining" at all.
If the general problem of successor insurance is that of Theseus'
ship, Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. 16 3 is a transac-
tional depiction of Theseus in the Labyrinth.164
At the heart of the "tortuous corporate history" recounted was a
classic long-tailed liability. The original Glidden manufactured lead
paint.s65 In 1967, it merged into SCM, which carried Glidden's opera-
tions forward in one division or subsidiary after another (along with
similar but distinct business and product lines) until 1986.166 Just
before that time, SCM created a wholly owned subsidiary, transferring
thereto its domestic paints operations. 167 At relevant times, Glidden
and SCM were separately insured by different liability policies.'68
Control of SCM was acquired by a subsidiary of Hanson.169 Han-
son then liquidated the subsidiary and distributed SCM stock to
twenty separate Hanson subsidiaries evocatively described as the "fan
companies." 70 Later in 1986, the set of businesses in which the out-
line of the former Glidden could be glimpsed was transferred to one
of the fan companies, No. 6.171 Hanson then sold No. 6 to ICI, at
which point it was rechristened Glidden 11.172 Hanson and ICI agreed
that while Hanson would retain ownership of all its insurance policies
(in truth, the policies once issued to Glidden and SCM), a side agree-
and when it should be imposed by operation of law. Broadening the reach of the identity-based
view would better align with commercial realities.
163. Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 861 N.E.2d 109, 120 (Ohio 2006).
164. See Plutarch, supra note 1, at 15-19 (recounting Theseus' escape from the Labyrinth of
Crete, a maze so ingenious that many were those who, "wandering in the labyrinth, and finding
no possible means of getting out . . . miserably ended their lives there").
165. Glidden, 861 N.E.2d at 112.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 113.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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ment apparently provided that Hanson would grant ICI the benefit of
any insurance policies triggered by preacquisition activities. Subse-
quent decantation ensued for both Glidden (finally, Glidden III) and
SCM. 173 Two decades after it had precipitated out of this tangle, Glid-
den III sought coverage under the policies issued to its apparent
predecessors.
Glidden Co. was decided on the same day as Pilkington; the deci-
sion largely rests on the rules there articulated and the meaning of the
side agreement.174 Under Pilkington-as in Henkel-successor liabil-
ity assumed by contract cannot be a basis for transfer of insurance
assets by operation of law.'75 With respect to the side agreement, the
court observed that Hanson did not directly own the insurance assets;
they resided at the time of Glidden II's creation in a separate Hanson
subsidiary, SCM.17 6 Although, under Pilkington, SCM would have
had the power notwithstanding anti-assignment language to transfer
the right to indemnity, SCM did not in fact do so, and the Glidden Co.
court declined to treat SCM as a mere puppet of Hanson in order to
vindicate Hanson's promise to ICI-Glidden.177
The sheer complexity of Glidden Co.'s corporate history gives
pause. Few reorganizations may be as complicated in such a short
span (many of the events abbreviated above took place in a single
year). But given enough time, a great many corporate policyholders
will mutate beyond recognition. And underlying this Article is the
idea that there will be time, given the structure of occurrence-based
liability policies. Should an insurer be required, like Kafka's messen-
ger, to wade through an endless sea of personality to deliver its prom-
ise to the true addressee?' 78
And how many addressees might there be? Part of the Henkel ra-
tionale for denying coverage was the fear that insurers might be re-
quired to defend original policyholders and their successors. Now,
that was not an actual problem in Henkel, because the plaintiffs volun-
tarily dismissed the predecessor, having apparently satisfied them-
selves that the real (pre-acquisition) wrongdoer had taken the form of
the successor.179 In another case, perhaps, a plaintiff might proceed
against both firms. In addition to multiplying the physical costs of
173. Id.
174. Id. at 109.
175. See Pilkington, 861 N.E.2d at 138.
176. Id. at 129.
177. Glidden, 861 N.E.2d at 120.
178. Franz Kafka, An Imperial Message, in CoiCCi-riCED STroRIES 182, 182-83 (Gabriel losi-
povici ed., Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., 1993).
179. Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 62 P.3d 69, 72 (Cal. 2003).
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defense, such cases present potential ethical challenges, as successors
and predecessors seek to blame one another. In long-tailed claims
such as toxic torts, this is a genuine possibility. Although the precise
structures used in the Glidden-SCM reorganizations seem to avoid it,
it requires little imagination to see the possibility of a "fan" of twenty
or more successors. 80 I believe this is why the Ohio court was unable
to clearly state whether the duty to defend was alienable as a chose in
action, as was the duty to indemnify.' 8'
A priori, assuring financial responsibility to tort victims says little
about the allocation of defense costs. And insurers have a facially
appealing concern that multiparty transfers materially change the
risks the insurers have agreed to undertake. However, the comple-
mentarity principle urged by this Article balances the interests of all
actors in the liability system. Severing the duty to defend from the
duty to indemnify does harm to each of the constituencies served by
successor liability law, including insurers' own interests. Ohio should
have completed its second step away from Henkel.
As an eloquent dissent in Pilkington observed, "[t]he operation of
law theory offers the simplest, cleanest solution" to the insurance
problems created by corporate restructurings.182 The liability sys-
tem-which is to say, litigants, insurers, and the norms of these inter-
dependent systems-are well served by the long-standing link
between defense and indemnity. The policyholder obtains the benefit
of the insurer's litigation expertise. Even for long-tailed liabilities that
are "new" for the lately arrived successor, insurers can moderate loss
exposure whenever they know more about claim patterns than the
policyholder, which will be often. The complication of succession
does not diminish the indemnitor's interest in controlling litigation so
as to prevent opportunistic settlement or litigation behavior by the
indemnitee. And although it is perhaps unfortunate that historic lia-
bility policies did not link defense costs to the insurer's aggregate re-
180. They could each be liable under the "product line" theory if they continued to manufac-
ture, perhaps with separate territories or licensing variations, the predecessor's products; under
the "continuity of enterprise" view, they might be liable if the predecessor's personnel and trade-
marks were distributed among them. Finally, each could promise to assume the predecessor's
liabilities. However, the characteristic use of indirect subsidiaries in the Glidden transactions
eliminated these possibilities.
181. See Glidden, 861 N.E.2d at 120. The trial judge in Glidden suggested that a duty to
defend the multiple "fan companies" was the "logical extension" of Glidden's coverage theory.
See Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., Nos. 409039 & 411388,2002 WL 34236384 (Ohio
Ct. of Common Pleas, May 8, 2002).
182. Glidden, 861 N.E.2d at 120 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
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sponsibilities to its policyholders,' 83 this is not a problem that ought to
be resolved on the fortuitous selection of one form of reorganization
over another.
Moreover, coordinating defense and indemnity serves the legiti-
mate interests of transacting parties. Sundering the two introduces
unnecessary uncertainty into corporate reorganizations. By cabining
the alienability of part of the liability insurance asset, the Pilkington
approach undermines the efficiencies that corporate restructurings
aim to uncover. Might transacting parties desire to allocate indemnity
to one and a defense to the other? Perhaps, but this would suggest the
kind of fraudulent transfer that is condemned by successor liability
law. And it is difficult to see why an insurer might desire such an
arrangement.
The specter of the hydra-headed successor suggested by Glidden is
answered by the fact that insurers are already subject to the diverging
claims of the firm as it evolves. As the DES example suggests, there
will be many iterations of a firm throughout its history; cycles of
shareholders (some who may be controlling) and formal mergers al-
ready subject the liability insurer's responsibilities to the internal
workings of the firm. While this Article favors a slightly broadened
concept of succession for liability purposes, liability insurance already
presupposes many of the corporate changes that are certain to occur
over time.184 These changes may create material differences in liabil-
ity risk going forward, but these are not the liabilities at issue in suc-
cessor insurance cases.
The potential for ethical conflict exists, but liability insurers and
corporate policyholders are already substantially adverse in much of
tort litigation; I am not sure this potential complication fundamentally
worsens that dynamic. Moreover, it will in many instances resemble
the conflict that arises when insurers seek to impute occurrences to
periods when the policyholder was insured by another firm, or to peri-
ods when the policyholder held less, possibly non-existent coverage.
183. That is, older insurance policies did not specify that defense expenditures by the insurer
would be credited against the policy limits; in many long-tailed products-liability claims, the duty
to defend has proven far more valuable than the often modest underlying limits thought suffi-
cient in an earlier era.
184. The point is well made by Jeffrey Stempel. Tracing the drafting history of the standard
Commercial General Liability policy, he notes,
Insurers appear to have regarded [automatic expansion of liability coverage to reflect
acquisitions and other operational changes] as the natural corollary to the comprehen-
sive nature of the CGL policy, which was marketed as broad coverage designed to allay
policyholder concerns regarding the need to purchase other, particularized liability
policies.
Stempel, supra note 37, at 412.
[Vol. 60:573624
FOLLOWING FORM
That conflict is real, not theoretical; we do not ignore it by depriving
insurers of the right to prove themselves out of non-coverage. Nor
should the law deprive successors of coverage essential to the opera-
tions they have acquired simply because some cases will be difficult.
Ironically, the easiest solution to this potential problem might be to
tie successor liability more firmly to considerations relevant to tort
law rather than to the law of corporations. Tort-relevant assets and
operations may be unlikely to be scattered as broadly as the creativity
of corporate lawyers theoretically permits. But that would elevate the
norms of one system over another; complementarity does
otherwise. 85
XIV. CONCLUSION
The riddle of Theseus' ship asks whether identity is continuity of
substance or essence. The law governing corporate succession and in-
surance must account for its course along the river Thames, 186 while
observing the constraints imposed by co-equal bodies of law. A
healthy regard for one's neighbors-complementarity-requires the
law to coordinate among these systems, containing elements which are
frustratingly indifferent to one another. Specifically, the divergent
ways the systems manage the uncertainty of future tort liabilities
should be constrained by their inescapable interdependence. Linking
liability insurance to the wrongs discernible through the tangle of cor-
porate restructuring balances the essential character of each system,
and the legitimate needs of its constituencies, with those of the others.
Ultimately, complementarity merely recognizes that no law is an is-
land, entire of itself. 87
185. It is interesting to observe that although succeeding to the name and business of Glidden,
Glidden III is not considered a successor. From the opinion, it is unclear whether any entity is a
successor, under Ohio law, to the liability of Glidden. Glidden, 861 N.E.2d at 120. The trial
opinion was skeptical; amazingly, this issue was not even briefed. This is in fact consistent with
the traditional corporate law rule, a rule that if left unvarnished is fundamentally at odds with
the perspective of the tort system.
186. "But when united into a corporation, they and their successors ... are but one person in
law, a person that never dies; in like manner as the River Thames is still the same river, though
the parts which compose it are changing every instant." Tinr STUDENT's BLACKSTONE 102-03
(Robert Malcolm & Napier Kerr eds., 1885).
187. Cf JoN DONNE, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONs 86-87 (Anthony Raspa ed.,
1987). In insurance argot, a liability policy is said to "follow form" to another when its provi-
sions are unspecified, and rely on the second policy for their terms.
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